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THE

NARRATIVE

OF

Lieut. Gen. Sir WILLIAM HOWE, &c.

[PRICE THREE SHILLINGS.]

Published Sept. 14. 1780.

THE

NARRATIVE

OF

Lieut. Gen. Sir WILLIAM HOWE,

IN

A COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,

ON THE 29TH OF APRIL, 1779,

RELATIVE TO

HIS CONDUCT,

DURING

HIS LATE COMMAND OF THE KING'S TROOPS

IN

NORTH AMERICA:

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

SOME OBSERVATIONS UPON A PAMPHLET,

ENTITLED,

LETTERS TO A NOBLEMAN.

LONDON:

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MDCCLXXX.

NARRATIVE

OF

HIS CONDUCT

IN A

LATE COMMAND OF THE KING'S FRIGATE

TO

Lieut. Gen. Sir WILLIAM HOWE,

IN A

LETTER

TO

MEMBER

OF A

COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,

ON THE

STATE OF THE NATION.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

SOME OBSERVATIONS UPON A PAMPHLET

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OF

Lieut. Gen. Sir WILLIAM HOWE, &c.

IF the peculiarities of my ſituation be conſidered, I ſhall not be thought preſumptuous in deſiring the indulgence of the committee during the treſpaſs I muſt this day commit upon their patience. The repugnance of his Majeſty's miniſters (in this Houſe at leaſt) to declare any opinion concerning the tranſactions of the American war during my command, although poſſeſſed of all the neceſſary, and only, documents, upon which a judgement could have been formed, impelled me to move, that my correſpondence with the Secretary of State for the American department, might be laid before you. The moſt material parts of my conduct, the reaſons upon which I acted, the plans which I ſuggeſted and executed, appear in that correſpondence; and therefore to thoſe who may have connected the whole in a regular ſeries of dates and events, the detail into which I propoſe to enter may ſeem unneceſſary. But I cannot flatter myſelf that the papers have been conſidered with ſuch minute attention, nor can I preſume to ſuppoſe, that all the circumſtances of the American war have been inveſtigated with the partial view of clearing the conduct of the man who commanded the army. And, Sir, it is with that partial view I now riſe—for I mean not to call in queſtion the juſtice, nor the policy of that war;

I mean not to call in queſtion the expediency of meaſures which have been framed, relaxed, or perſevered in, by the councils at home. My object, at preſent, is confined to the explanation of my own conduct.

Many are the cenſures that have been paſſed upon me. The miſrepreſentations and falſe arguments of my enemies have made a deep impreſſion upon minds too prompt to decide; whilſt an ignorance of the true ſtate of facts has left the unprejudiced in doubt. Thoſe who alone could do me juſtice, have been ſilent; and therefore to the judgement of this committee, and to the impartiality of my country at large, I at laſt reſort, flattering myſelf with the hope of an ample juſtification.

In the courſe of the great variety of buſineſs which fell to my lot, during ſuch a wide and extenſive command, faults muſt undoubtedly be perceived, but none I hope which can be ſuſpected to have ariſen from want of zeal, or from inactivity. In all military tranſactions, but more particularly in thoſe of America, where the nature of the war, in all its points, is without example, the happieſt commander will he be who eſcapes with the feweſt blots.

The facts to which I principally wiſh to turn the attention of the committee, and which the papers upon your table bear witneſs to, are

1*ſt*. That I did not neglect to furniſh the miniſter of the American department with every information, as well as with my ideas, relative to the conduct of the war from time to time.

2*d*. That I did not fail to give my opinions reſpecting what appeared practicable to be done, with the ſuccours required, or expected from Europe, and with the force at different times on the ſpot.

3*d*. That my plans were carried into execution with as little deviation, as, from the nature of military operations, could have been expected.

4*th*. That

4th. That I never flattered the miniſter with improper hopes of ſeeing the war terminated in any one campaign, with the force at any one time under my command.

I ſhall now beg leave to trouble the committee with a narrative of thoſe material operations of the war, which may lead to an impartial judgement upon my general conduct, which may obviate miſconceived opinions concerning particular events, and which, with ſome few remarks upon the ſeveral paſſages of the correſpondence as they ariſe, may elucidate the truth of the facts premiſed.

The evacuation of Boſton was the firſt material occurrence, after my appointment to the command of his Majeſty's forces in North America.

On the 9th of November, 1775, I received the Secretary of State's order dated the 5th of September, to abandon that town before winter, and to move the army to New-York, or to ſome other place to the ſouthward; my own reaſons, indeed, againſt opening the campaign from Boſton, had been in the mean time generally ſet forth in a letter to his lordſhip of the 9th of October. The late arrival of the order, and the deficiency of tranſport tonnage, rendered the removal of the troops impracticable till the 17th of March following, when I embarked with about 6000 rank and file, fit for duty, and about 900 ſick.

It has not been inſinuated, that any diſgrace was brought upon his Majeſty's arms by the manner in which that town was evacuated. (*a*)

My letter of the 21ſt of March, 1776, accounts for my carrying the army, with the incumbrances then belonging to it, to

 Hallifax,

(*a*) In the examination of General Robertſon (one of the witneſſes called by Lord George Germain) an attempt was made to prove that conſiderable quantities of linen and woollen merchandizes, which might be of great uſe to the rebels, were left at Boſton, upon the evacuation of that town, although it was in my power to have carried the whole away. But though the General was of opinion that thoſe goods might have been removed with the army, it was merely in the idea, conceived from report, that they might have been carried away, if the holds of the tranſports had been well ſtowed; for he acknowledged that we were in great want of ſhipping, and that we took with us all the veſſels that were fit to go to ſea.

Hallifax, in preference to any other port. Concluding that the reaſons there given are ſatisfactory, I do not trouble the committee with any farther explanation, except, that I think the army by going thither, received great benefit, not only from neceſſary refreſhments, but from the opportunity of being exerciſed in line, a very material part of diſcipline, in which we were defective until that time. I might alſo add, that the troops performed very eſſential ſervice at Hallifax, by conſtructing redoubts, and other ſtrong works, for the defence of the town and dock, which could not have been executed by the garriſon.

My letters go on to ſhow how the army was diſpoſed of previous to the landing upon Long-Iſland, while waiting for the arrival of the troops from Europe, and from the expedition againſt South Carolina. That intermediate time, as I do not recollect, amongſt the multiplicity of anonymous publications againſt me, any fault has been imputed, I paſs over, remarking only, that from the violent heat of the weather, little active ſervice could have been done, and that ſuch ſervice would probably have been attended with much ſickneſs to the troops.

I beg leave here to ſay, that although, to ſave the time of the committee, I may omit to mention many tranſactions of the war, I ſhall be willing to ſolve all doubts which the members of this committee may entertain, with reſpect to circumſtances not touched upon, or not ſufficiently explained.

I haſten to the action at Bedford on Long-Iſland the 27th of Auguſt, 1776, where a paragraph in my publick letter of the 3d of September has been quoted againſt me as a violent charge. The paragraph is as follows. " Had the troops been per-
" mitted to go on, it is my opinion they would have carried the
" redoubts, but as it was apparent the lines muſt have been
" ours at a cheap rate, by regular approaches, I would not riſk
" the loſs that might have been ſuſtained in the aſſault, and
" ordered them back to a hollow way in the front of the works,
" out of the reach of muſquetry."

This paragraph, I am free to own, I added to give here the ſame impreſſion that I felt of the ardour of the troops upon that occaſion. But I am at a loſs to know from whence it has been ſuppoſed

ſuppoſed, that carrying the lines would have been followed by the defeat of the rebel army. The facts are theſe:—The rebels had a body of men poſted in front of the lines, to guard againſt an attack from Flat-Buſh, and from the lower road upon their right. Thoſe troops were defeated with conſiderable loſs. The remainder of the corps was poſted behind the lines, the main army being then on York-Iſland; ſo that admitting the works to have been forced on the day of action, the only advantage we ſhould have gained would have been the deſtruction of a few more men, for the retreat of the greateſt part would have been ſecured by the works conſtructed upon the heights of Brooklyn, oppoſite to New-York, and their embarkation covered by a number of floating batteries.

On the other hand, the moſt eſſential duty I had to obſerve was, not wantonly to commit his majeſty's troops, where the object was inadequate. I knew well that any conſiderable loſs ſuſtained by the army could not ſpeedily, nor eaſily, be repaired. I alſo knew that one great point towards gaining the confidence of an army (and a general without it is upon the moſt dangerous ground) is never to expoſe the troops, where, as I ſaid before, the object is inadequate. In this inſtance, from the certainty of being in poſſeſſion of the lines in a very few days, by breaking ground, to have permitted the attack in queſtion, would have been inconſiderate, and even criminal. The loſs of 1000, or perhaps 1500 Britiſh troops, in carrying thoſe lines, would have been but ill repaid by double that number of the enemy, could it have been ſuppoſed they would have ſuffered in that proportion.

The neceſſary preparations, and erecting batteries, to facilitate the landing upon the iſland of New-York, and battering the enemy's works at Horens-Hook, occupied us till the 15th of September, when the poſſeſſion of New-York was effected, as appears by my letter of the 21ſt of September, 1776.

From that time to the 12th of October we were employed in fortifying the heights from Macgowan's-Paſs to the North River, about two miles from the enemy's moſt advanced intrenchments, and in getting poſſeſſion of Paulus-Hook. Some time was alſo neceſſarily employed in enquiries reſpecting the face of the country

country to be poſſeſſed, upon a ſuppoſition that the enemy ſhould remove from King's-Bridge. There was a neceſſity of intrenching upon the height I have mentioned, in order to cover New-York in the abſence of the main army. My publick letters of the 23d, 24th, and 25th of September point out all theſe particulars.

With regard to the knowledge of the country, ſo neceſſary to be obtained previous to the movement from New-York, I beg leave to mention the difficulties we laboured under in that reſpect throughout the war. The country is ſo covered with wood, ſwamps, and creeks, that it is not open in the leaſt degree to be known, but from poſt to poſt, or from accounts to be collected from the inhabitants entirely ignorant of military deſcription. Theſe circumſtances were therefore the cauſe of ſome unavoidable delay in our movements.

I muſt here add, that I found the Americans not ſo well diſpoſed to join us, and to ſerve, as I had been taught to expect; that I thought our farther progreſs for the preſent, precarious, and that I ſaw no proſpect of finiſhing the war that campaign. Theſe ſentiments I communicated to the Secretary of State in the letters laſt mentioned.

From the 12th of October, the day the army landed on Frogs-Neck, to the 21ſt of the ſame month, we were employed in getting up ſtores and proviſions, in bringing over the dragoons, the ſecond diviſion of Heſſians, the carriages and horſes for tranſporting proviſions, artillery, ammunition, and baggage. Four or five days had been unavoidably taken up in landing at Frog's-Neck, inſtead of going at once to Pell's-Point, which would have been an imprudent meaſure, as it could not have been executed without much unneceſſary riſk.

On the 28th of October the engagement at the White-Plains took place. But it has been aſſerted, that, by my not attacking the lines on the day of action, I loſt an opportunity of deſtroying the rebel army; and it has been alſo ſaid, that I might have cut off the enemy's retreat by the Croton-Bridge. Sir, an aſſault upon the enemy's right, which was oppoſed to the Heſſian troops, was intended. The committee muſt give me credit when I aſſure

them, that I have political reaſons, and no other, for declining to explain why that aſſault was not made. Upon a minute enquiry thoſe reaſons might, if neceſſary, be brought out in evidence at the bar. If, however, the aſſault had been made, and the lines carried, the enemy would have got off without much loſs, and no way had we, that I could ever learn, of cutting off their retreat by the Croton-Bridge. I cannot conceive the foundation of ſuch an idea. By forcing the lines we ſhould undoubtedly have gained a more brilliant advantage, ſome baggage, and ſome proviſions; but we had no reaſon to ſuppoſe that the rebel army could have been deſtroyed. The ground in their rear was ſuch as they could wiſh, for ſecuring their retreat, which indeed ſeemed to be their principal object. And, Sir, I do not heſitate to confeſs, that if I could by any manœuvre remove an enemy from a very advantageous poſition, without hazarding the conſequences of an attack, where the point to be carried was not adequate to the loſs of men to be expected from the enterpriſe, I ſhould certainly adopt that cautionary conduct, in the hopes of meeting my adverſary upon more equal terms.

But to proceed in my narrative.—My publick letter of the 30th of November relates the further proceedings of the army, until Lord Cornwallis arrived at Brunſwick in the Jerſeys, in which is included the taking of Fort-Waſhington, afterwards called Fort Knyphauſen. I need not trouble the committee with other particulars in that period: But I muſt ſay I ſhould have been highly blameable, had I ordered the noble lord to have followed the enemy beyond Brunſwick, when the whole of his corps had not joined him.

I refer to my publick letter of the 20th of December for an account of the progreſs of that corps until the 14th of that month, when they went into cantonments, which I was hopeful they might have maintained. My firſt intentions were to have made Brunſwick the left, and Eliſabeth-Town, or Newark, the right of thoſe cantonments; and my reaſon for extending to Trenton was, that a conſiderable number of the inhabitants came in with their arms, in obedience to the proclamation of the commiſſioners on the 30th of November. I took upon me to riſk that poſt under the command of a brave officer, with the ſupport of

of Colonel Donop at Bordentown, five miles diſtant, with a very ſtrong corps. The two poſts were occupied by nine battalions, the Heſſiaan cavalry, and a party of the 16th regiment of light dragoons, amounting in the whole to upwards of 3000 men, with ſixteen field pieces. The light infantry of the army, a brigade of infantry, and ſome dragoons, were poſted at Princetown, in the chain of cantonments, twelve miles from Trenton.

But it has been objected to me that I ought not to have intruſted the important poſt of Trenton to the Heſſian troops. My anſwer to this, if clearly underſtood, will I think be ſatisfactory. Military men will certainly underſtand it. The left, Sir, was the poſt of the Heſſians in the line, and had I changed it upon this occaſion it muſt have been conſidered as a diſgrace, ſince the ſame ſituation held in the cantonments as in the camp. And it probably would have created jealouſies between the Heſſian and Britiſh troops, which it was my duty carefully to prevent.

Colonel Donop, who commanded the two poſts, was perfectly ſatisfied with his ſituation, and ſo was Colonel Rhall. They both had timely information of the intended attack: The numbers of the enemy, I was credibly informed, did not exceed 3000, and if Colonel Rhall had obeyed the orders I ſent to him for the erecting of redoubts, I am confident his poſt would not have been taken.

I would aſk thoſe who object to this part of the diſtribution, where could the Heſſian troops have been better employed than in the defence of a poſt? In the laſt war they were eſteemed not unequal to any troops in Prince Ferdinand's army, and I ſhould do them much injuſtice were I not to ſay they were in very high order in America. Two of theſe very battalions had ſerved in Germany with great credit, and the whole brigade under Colonel Rhall's command had given a recent proof of their bravery at the attack of Fort-Knyphauſen.

The poſſeſſion of Trenton was extremely deſirable; could we have preſerved it we ſhould have covered the greateſt part of the country to the eaſtward of Princetown, including the whole county of Monmouth, where I had reaſon to think there were many loyal inhabitants. We ſhould alſo have been ſo near Phi-

ladelphia that we might poſſibly have taken poſſeſſion of it in the courſe of the winter; though I confeſs I had ſeveral reaſons for doubting the expediency of that meaſure at that time.

My principal object in ſo great an extenſion of the cantonments was to afford protection to the inhabitants, that they might experience the difference between his majeſty's government, and that to which they were ſubject from the rebel leaders. For, Sir, although ſome perſons condemn me for having endeavoured to conciliate his majeſty's rebellious ſubjects, by taking every means to prevent the deſtruction of the country, inſtead of irritating them by a contrary mode of proceeding, yet am I, from many reaſons, ſatisfied in my own mind that I acted in that particular for the benefit of the king's ſervice. Miniſters themſelves, I am perſuaded, did at one time entertain a ſimilar doctrine, and from a circumſtance not now neceſſary to dwell upon, it is certain that I ſhould have had little reaſon to hope for ſupport from them, if I had been diſpoſed to acts of great ſeverity. Had it been afterwards judged good policy to turn the plan of the war into an indiſcriminate devaſtation of that country, and had I been thought the proper inſtrument for executing ſuch a plan, miniſters, I preſume, would have openly ſtood forth, and ſent clear, explicit, orders. Ambiguous meſſages, hints, whiſpers acroſs the Atlantick, to be avowed or diſavowed at pleaſure, would have been paltry ſafeguards for the honour and conduct of a commander in chief.

I now return to my narrative.—Previous to the loſs of Trenton I had detached General Clinton with 6000 men to take poſſeſſion of Rhode-Iſland, the ſucceſs of which expedition is mentioned in my public letter of the 20th of December, 1776. This was one material point in the general plan of operations. And here I muſt beg leave to call the attention of the committee to my ſeparate letter of the 30th of November, 1776, wherein is ſet forth my firſt plan for the next campaign, with the force requiſite, in order, if poſſible, to finiſh the war in one year. My propoſitions were, that we ſhould have 10,000 men to act on the ſide of Rhode-Iſland, and penetrate eaſtward into the country towards Boſton, leaving 2000 for the defence of Rhode-Iſland, 10,000 in the province of New-York, to move up the North River to Albany, 5000 for the defence of York-Iſland and its De-

pendencies, 8000 to cover Jerſey, and to keep General Waſhington's army in check, by giving a jealouſy to Philadelphia, which as well as Virginia I propoſed to attack in autumn, provided the ſucceſs of other operations ſhould have admitted of ſending thither an adequate force. South Carolina and Georgia I propoſed as objects for winter. But to carry this plan into execution I informed his Lordſhip, that ten ſhips of the line, and a re-inforcement of 15,000 rank and file would be abſolutely neceſſary, beſides an additional battalion of artillery. According to this calculation the army under my command would probably have conſiſted of 35,000 effective men, to oppoſe 50,000 voted by the Congreſs for the next campaign, excluſive of the large bodies of militia, who were to be collected on the ſhorteſt notice. I mentioned at the ſame time the ſpirit infuſed into the people by their leaders from the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of procuring the aſſiſtance of foreign powers, and that it was ſaid Doctor Franklin was gone to France to ſollicit the aid of that court.

This letter of the 30th of November was received by the Secretary of State on the 30th of December. On the 9th of March, 1777, I received his lordſhip's anſwer, dated the 14th of January. This anſwer it is to be obſerved was by no means deciſive. The determination upon my plan was poſtponed until the arrival of my next letter, when Major Balfour (one of my aids de camp, and then in England) was to be immediately diſpatched. My requiſition, as has been juſt ſtated, was for 15,000 rank and file, in order to complete the army to 35,000 effective men. The noble lord, in the letter I am now quoting, hopes that he ſhall be able to augment the army under my command to near 35,000, although he propoſes ſending me only 7,800. This miſconceived calculation can no otherwiſe be accounted for, as I apprehend, than by his lordſhip's computing the ſick, and the priſoners with the rebels, as a part of the real effective ſtrength of the army; and yet I cannot ſee how ſuch a miſtake could have ariſen, as my requiſition was ſpecific, for 15,000 men, rank and file. His lordſhip further declares, that it is beyond his power to furniſh me with the additional battalion of artillery. If any thing could be an alleviation of my diſappointment in theſe reſpects, it was the aſſurance which accompanied it, that—
" whatever degree of ſupport the rebels had been taught to
" expect

" expect from foreign powers, his lordſhip had great reaſon to " believe that Doctor Franklin would not be able to procure " them any open aſſiſtance."

During the doubts I entertained, whether the large re-inforcement I had requeſted would arrive in time for the execution of the extenſive plan mentioned in my letter of the 30th of November, 1776, I had information, which I thought might be depended on, that the reduction of Pennſylvania was practicable, even upon the ſuppoſition that the whole of my ſtrength, fit for duty at the opening of the campaign, might not exceed 19,000 men. I therefore ſuggeſted, in my ſeparate letter of the 20th of December, 1776, a ſecond plan, which was for acting next campaign in Pennſylvania, and which, when I was told I muſt expect a re-inforcement of only 7800 men, little more than half my requiſition, I concluded was to be adopted.

I remarked that by this plan the march towards Boſton, which I had before propoſed, muſt be deferred until the required re-inforcements ſhould arrive from Europe; but as theſe operations, perhaps of the laſt importance to the nation, might depend upon the exigencies of the moment, I ſollicited his lordſhip to point out any general plans that might be thought moſt adviſeable, as well with reſpect to the preſent ſtrength of the army, as in the event of re-inforcements, remarking to me the periods of time in which I might expect the arrival of troops. This letter having been received in England on the 23d of February, 1777, which was long before General Burgoyne's departure, the miniſter had full opportunity of communicating the contents to that general, and of making ſuch changes as he might judge expedient to co-incide with the northern operations.

Preſuming that it was my duty to omit no opportunity of communicating, though it might be deemed repeating, my ideas to the Secretary of State, my private letter of the 20th of January, 1777, was alſo full and explicit. I there aſſure him, that there muſt be another campaign, for I found that upon the good news from Quebec, in 1776, he had hoped, that a proſpect was open for ending the war in one campaign. I preſſed for more troops—I told him that a re-inforcement of 20,000 men was requiſite, but that 15,000 would give us a ſuperiority,

pointing out Philadelphia, for the reaſons before mentioned, as the principal object; I obſerved, that an augmentation of 20,000 men would admit of my detaching a corps thither by ſea, whilſt the main body might penetrate by the way of Jerſey. On the other hand I obſerved, that if the re-inforcements were ſmall the operations would be of courſe curtailed. This letter alſo arrived in England prior to General Burgoyne's departure. Both letters are anſwered the 3d of March, 1777, and brought by Major Balfour, who arrived at New-York on the 8th of May.

I had now the Secretary of State's entire approbation of my ſecond plan, the expedition to Pennſylvania; my reaſons for deviating from my former plan being, as his lordſhip is pleaſed to expreſs himſelf, ſolid and deciſive. He laments, however, that inſtead of augmenting the army to 35,000, which I had requeſted, and which I had ſome reaſon to hope for, inſtead of even re-inforcing me with 7,800 he could only allow me to expect 2,900, that is to ſay not a fifth part of the number I had required. It is to be obſerved, that his lordſhip at the ſame time, notwithſtanding ſo great a reduction of the re-inforcements requiſite for the operations determined upon and approved of, recommends a warm diverſion to be made on the coaſts of Maſſachuſet's-Bay and New Hampſhire, as far as the main plan will permit. The admiral and I however, agreeably to his Lordſhip's commands, conſulted upon the expediency of the diverſion, and in my letter of the 3d of June, 1777, I informed the Secretary of State, that we found it not to be practicable without interfering materially with thoſe more important operations of the campaign which had been approved of by himſelf, and which were already too much curtailed from a want of a land force.—The army fit for actual duty at this time, excluſive of about 2000 provincials, was 14,000 ſhort of the number I had expected.

But to reſume the chain of my correſpondence. Finding by the Secretary of State's letter of the 14th of Jan. 1777, received on the 9th of March following, that the re-inforcements were not to be expected, I totally relinquiſhed, in my ſecret letter of the 2d of April, the idea of any offenſive operation, except that to the Southward, and a diverſion occaſionally upon Hudſon's-

River. I informed the Secretary of State that the principal part of the plan formerly propoſed could no longer be thought of; that the Jerſeys muſt be abandoned, and Pennſylvania be invaded only by ſea; that in the former campaign my force was equal to the operations, but that in the enſuing one, from the ſeveral poſts neceſſary to be preſerved, the offenſive army would be too weak for rapid ſucceſs; and that reſtricted as I was from entering upon more extenſive operations by the want of force, my hopes of terminating the war that year were vaniſhed; that notwithſtanding the whole rebel army, 50,000 men, voted in autumn, might not be raiſed, the enemy would have a numerous militia in the field, in addition to their ſtanding force, and a good train of artillery. I at the ſame time tranſmitted my diſtribution of the army for the campaign, by which it is to be obſerved, that my real effective force, excluſive of 3000 provincials amounted only to 18,100 (*b*).

The noble Lord's anſwer to this letter, dated the 18th of May, 1777, contains a repeated approbation of the expedition to Pennſylvania; but it is remarkable in other reſpects—He ſtates his inability to furniſh me with the ſupplies requeſted, and is concerned to find that I do not imagine my force to be as ſuitable to the operations of the enſuing campaign, as I had confeſſed it was to thoſe of the laſt. Theſe expreſſions, Sir, require obſervation—They ſeem eager to catch me in the confeſſion that my force was ſuitable to the operations of the laſt campaign, and would from thence imply, that my force was equally ſuitable to the operations of any other campaign. Now, Sir, even if I had not explained my idea upon that point (which however I clearly did) I think it might have been obvious to any man leſs acquainted than his lordſhip with military reaſoning, that the force, which had been ſufficient to take poſſeſſion of New-York, and other ſtrong holds of the enemy, could not, after the neceſſary diviſions for preſerving the variety of poſts we had gained, be equally ſuitable to the making of new conqueſts. For is it not ſelf-evident, that the power of an army muſt diminiſh in proportion to the decreaſe of their numbers? And muſt not their numbers for the field neceſſarily decreaſe, in proportion to the towns,

(*b*) In ſtating numbers preſent, rank and file fit for duty is always meant.

towns, poſts, or forts, which we take, and are obliged to preſerve? But his Lordſhip proceeds to ſay, that his concern (on account of this imagination of mine) is in a great degree alleviated by the intelligence which he daily receives, of the rebels finding the utmoſt difficulty in raiſing an army to face his Majeſty's troops—From the ſuppoſed weakneſs of the enemy, and the good inclination of the inhabitants, he has every reaſon to expect that my ſucceſs in Pennſylvania will enable me to raiſe amongſt them ſuch a force, as may be ſufficient for the interior defence of the province—He declines a particular conſideration of the advantages which may be expected from a ſucceſsful execution of my preſent plan, but is pleaſed to inform me (in contradiction to my repeated repreſentations and aſſertions) that he is inſpired with no ſmall degree of hope, that this campaign will put an end to the unhappy conteſt. Thus, Sir, all my poſitive aſſurances, ariſing from a declared want of force, and from a plain ſtate of facts, are here anſwered with the ſingle argument of his own deluſive hopes, built upon a ſuppoſition of the enemy's weakneſs: To what a dilemma is a commander reduced, when, after having repeatedly complained of his deficiency of ſtrength, the miniſter, from information collected here at home, or from hopes ſuggeſted by fears, oppoſes his own conjecture (I cannot call it judgement) and tells him, that deciſive ſucceſs is ſtill expected from him? If the powers of this country, or the extent of his Lordſhip's influence, could not have raiſed the force required, that anſwer would have been ſatisfactory to me, and no reflection upon himſelf. That anſwer would have relieved my mind from an apprehenſion I began to entertain, that my opinions were no longer of weight; and that of courſe the confidence ſo neceſſary to the ſupport, ſatisfaction, and indeed, ſecurity, of every man in a reſponſible ſituation, was withdrawn. If the noble Lord had thought that my requiſition for more troops was unneceſſary, and that the force he had already furniſhed was adequate, why did he not take the manly part of appointing ſome other perſon to fulfil thoſe ſanguine expectations, which from duty and conviction I had laboured to diſcountenance?

In order to preſerve, as well as I can, the hiſtorical chronology, amidſt ſuch numerous events and quotations, I muſt in this

this place remind the committee, that in my letter to the Secretary of State of the 2d of April 1777, I enclosed a copy of a confidential letter which I wrote on the 5th of the same month spontaneously to Sir Guy Carleton; I say spontaneously, because I had not at that time received any official information concerning the plan of the northern expedition, which I conceived was to take place that year. It may be recollected, that the substance of this letter was, that I should probably be in Pennsylvania at the time when the northern army would be ready to enter the province of New-York; that little assistance was to be expected from me to facilitate their approach, as a want of sufficient strength in my own army would probably not admit of my detaching a corps to act up Hudson's River in the beginning of the campaign.

On the 5th of June I received a copy of the Secretary of State's letter to Sir Guy Carleton, dated the 26th of March 1777, wherein he communicates to him the plan of the northern expedition, and adds, "that he will write to Sir William Howe by the first packet."

I must observe, that this copy of a letter to Sir Guy Carleton, though transmitted to me, was not accompanied with any instructions whatsoever; and that the letter intended to have been written to me by the first packet, and which was probably to have contained some instructions, was never sent.

I come now to the summer of 1777, passing over the expeditions in March and April to Peeks-Kill and Danbury.

The progress of our army in Jersey being also fully mentioned in my letters upon the table, I likewise pass over the various occurrences there, previous to the embarkation at Staten-Island. But as I have been blamed for not marching, before I left Jersey, to attack General Washington, posted at Middlebrook, I must beg leave to trouble the committee with a few words upon that point.

To have attacked General Washington in that strong post I must necessarily have made a considerable circuit of the country; and having no prospect of forcing him, I did not think it

 advisable

adviſeable to loſe ſo much time as muſt have been employed upon that march, during the intenſe heat of the ſeaſon.

Excluſive of this conſideration, our return muſt have been through a very difficult and exhauſted country, where there was no poſſibility of keeping up the communication with Brunſwick, from whence alone we could draw our proviſions; and the force with me at that time, amounting only to about 11,000 men, it would not admit of ſufficient detachments to preſerve the communication. The movement which I did make in two columns was with a view of drawing on an action, if the enemy ſhould have deſcended from his poſt, and been tempted towards the Delaware, in order to defend the paſſage of the river, on a ſuppoſition that I intended to croſs it. But as the poſition of my firſt column at Hillſborough muſt have induced that idea, and yet had not the deſired effect, I determined to return to Brunſwick, and follow the plan which had been approved by the miniſter. Theſe reaſons, together with thoſe aſſigned in my letter of the 5th of July, 1777, will I hope ſufficiently account for my not attacking General Waſhington upon that occaſion. I muſt alſo obſerve, that even ſo long before as in my letter of the 2d of April, I declared it was not my intention to undertake any offenſive operation in the Jerſeys, unleſs ſome very advantageous opportunity ſhould offer.

But it has been aſked, why I did not croſs the Delaware, and proceed by land to Philadelphia? To this I anſwer, that, from a want of ſufficient means to paſs ſo large a river, I judged the difficulties and the riſk too great, more eſpecially as the enemy had a corps ready for the defence of it, excluſive of their main army in my rear.

I have already ſhown, that finding the promiſed re-inforcements were not to be expected, I informed the Secretary of State that the plan firſt propoſed could no longer be thought of; that the Jerſeys muſt be abandoned, and Pennſylvania be invaded only by ſea. The communication for proviſions through ſuch an extent of country could not poſſibly be maintained with the force then at my command. This, Sir, is ſurely a ſatisfactory anſwer to the charge of my not having proceeded to Philadelphia at that time by land.

In

In my next letter of the 7th of July, 1777, I obſerved " that the war was now upon a far different ſcale with reſpect " to the increaſed powers and ſtrength of the enemy, than it " was laſt campaign, their officers being much better, with an " addition of ſeveral from the French ſervice, and a reſpectable " train of field artillery: That 50 pieces of braſs cannon had been " landed at Boſton, and that the rebel army in Jerſey had al- " ready with it a field train of forty pieces—That unleſs the " Britiſh regiments were completed with draughts and good re- " cruits, we ſhould ſoon loſe our conſequence by the current " caſualties of a campaign, even without a general action: " That a corps of 10,000 Ruſſians, effective fighting men, might " inſure the ſucceſs of the war to Great-Britain in another cam- " paign: But that if they were not to be had, and if we " ſhould ſucceed this campaign in the poſſeſſion of Pennſyl- " vania, the Jerſeys, and the province of New York, (which " I had before ſaid muſt in a great meaſure depend upon the " ſucceſs of the northern army) the draughts of troops in that " caſe, for the preſervation of them in the next campaign, would " be great, at the ſame time that a conſiderable force would be " requiſite for the reduction of the northern provinces, wherein " three armies ſhould be employed to make it effectual: And " that even in our preſent ſtate, twenty regular battalions were " employed for the ſecurity of York-Iſland with its Dependencies, " and Rhode-Iſland."

It may be obſerved, that I made various alterations from time to time in the plans of operations, but I flatter myſelf they will be found ſolid, ſo far as they relate to the diſtribution of the troops to Rhode-Iſland, New-York, and the main army.

With regard to the main army, the queſtion is, " Whether it " could have been diſpoſed to better advantage than upon " the expedition which took place to Pennſylvania?"—an expe- dition ſaid by ſome gentlemen to have been the cauſe of the ſubſequent misfortunes: Thoſe gentlemen will, I preſume, endeavour to ſupport this ſtrong aſſertion by evidence of the officers, the General officers, upon whoſe opinions they profeſs to have founded their judgement. If there are any in this Com- mittee who have formed a ſimilar concluſion from their own

 reaſoning,

reaſoning, I truſt they will this day favour me with their ground for ſuch opinion, unleſs they ſhould be ſatisfied with what I am going to ſtate in my juſtification. And in making this requeſt I know I addreſs myſelf to men of honour, who cannot mean a wanton accuſation, but who may wiſh to be ſatisfied in points not ſufficiently explained.

And here, Sir, although I might ſhelter myſelf from this violent charge, by referring to the complete approbation, as well as the acquieſcence of the Secretary of State; and might anſwer every objection by the ſhort obſervation, that the reaſons for adopting this expedition are adjudged by his Lordſhip to be ſolid and deciſive; yet am I content to wave that juſtification, and to ſtand entirely upon the merits and policy of the meaſure itſelf.

Perſons of ſome authority, I am told, have ſaid, "that the "army ought to have gone into New-England, others that it "ought to have gone up Hudſon's River." Permit me to examine the propriety of both thoſe opinions, by conſidering what would have been the conſequences, if either of them had been adopted.

Suppoſe, in the firſt place, it had gone to New-England, would that meaſure have led to a concluſion of the war? I think not. For, Sir, wherever the main body of our army had gone, there moſt aſſuredly would General Waſhington have gone alſo. But that he would have avoided a general action, I am authoriſed to ſay, not only from his conſtant uniform conduct in that reſpect, (and in which, no doubt, he acted judiciouſly) but alſo from this very obvious reaſon: He knew we could not have kept any part of Connecticut in the winter, except one or two places upon the coaſt of the Sound; ſituations which would not have forwarded the recovery of that province.—In Connecticut, therefore, there was no object for which he could have been tempted to riſk a general action.

Beſides, the provinces of New England are not only the moſt populous, but their militia, when brought to action, the moſt perſevering of any in all North America; and it is not to be doubted that General Waſhington, with his main army, would have followed me into a country where the ſtrength of the Continent, encouraged by his preſence, would have been moſt ſpeedily collected.

In

In Pennſylvania the proſpect was very different. The increaſe of force which that country could afford to Waſhington was ſmall in compariſon to the other, and the defence of Philadelphia was an object, which I juſtly concluded would engage the whole of his attention. It was incumbent upon him to riſk a battle, to preſerve that Capital. And as my opinion has always been, that the defeat of the rebel regular army is the ſureſt road to peace, I invariably purſued the moſt probable means of forcing its Commander to action, under circumſtances the leaſt hazardous to the royal army; for even a victory, attended by a heavy loſs of men on our part, would have given a fatal check to the progreſs of the war, and might have proved irreparable.

Theſe, Sir, were my inducements, at the time, for carrying his Majeſty's arms into the province of Pennſylvania in preference to thoſe of New England. (*a*)

Had the re-inforcements I required been granted, New England would have had a ſhare in the general operations of the campaign while the main body acted to the ſouthward. But with an army upon the ſmaller ſcale, that plan was impracticable, and I have already given my reaſons why I could not carry the main army into thoſe provinces, unleſs I had been really deſirous of protracting the war for my private advantage, a motive which has been baſely imputed to me by thoſe who wiſh to perpetrate the ruin both of my profeſſional and my private character.

The ſecond ſuggeſtion is, that I ought to have gone up Hudſon's-River, in order to facilitate the approach of the northern army to Albany. What would have been the conſequences of ſuch an expedition? Before the object of it could have been attained, the forts in the Highlands muſt have been carried, which would probably have coſt a conſiderable number of men, defended, as they would have been, by General Waſhington's whole force. But theſe forts being carried, how would the enemy have acted? In one of theſe two ways: He would either have put himſelf between me and New-York, or between me and the northern army. In either caſe I am of opinion, that

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(*a*) I have omitted a computation of the ſtrength of the New England provinces, becauſe it is impoſſible to ſpeak of it with a ſufficient degree of accuracy.

the ſucceſs of our efforts upon Hudſon's-River, could not, from the many difficulties in penetrating through ſo very ſtrong a country, have been accompliſhed in time to have taken poſſeſſion of Philadelphia that campaign. But admitting I had at length reached Albany, what ſhould I have gained, after having expended the campaign upon that object alone, that I had not a right to expect by drawing off General Waſhington, with the principal American army, from any operations on that ſide?

When it is conſidered how invidious and how minute a ſcrutiny has been made into my conduct, and into the motives of my conduct, I ſhall not be thought to ſpeak abſurdly if I ſay, that had I adopted the plan of going up Hudſon's-River, it would have been alledged, that I had waſted the campaign with a conſiderable army under my command, merely to enſure the progreſs of the northern army, which could have taken care of itſelf, provided I had made a diverſion in its favour, by drawing off to the ſouthward the main army under General Waſhington. Would not my enemies have gone farther, and inſinuated, that, alarmed at the rapid ſucceſs which the honourable General had a right to expect when Ticonderoga fell, I had enviouſly graſped a ſhare of that merit which would otherwiſe have been all his own? and let me add, would not Miniſters have told you, as they truly might, that I had acted without any orders or inſtructions from Them; that General Burgoyne was directed to force his own way to Albany, and that they had put under his command troops ſufficient to effect the march? Would they not have referred you to the original and ſettled plan of that expedition (which is amongſt the papers on your table) to prove that no aſſiſtance from me was ſuggeſted? and would they not readily have impreſſed this houſe with the concluſion, that if any doubt could have ariſen in their minds of the ſucceſs of ſuch a well digeſted plan, they ſhould, from the beginning, have made me a party in it, and have given me explicit inſtructions to act accordingly?

And now, Sir, having ſufficiently, and I hope ſatisfactorily ſpoken to the two plans, which ſome perſons have judged ought to have taken place; I return to the only one which, in my opinion, could with propriety have been adopted.—After the

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moſt mature deliberation, and frequent conſultation with the Admiral, Lord Cornwallis, and other General officers; after weighing all the circumſtances of every poſſible operation; after the moſt probable concluſion, founded upon the beſt intelligence, that General Waſhington would follow me, I determined on purſuing that plan which would make the moſt effectual diverſion in favour of the northern army, which promiſed in its conſequences the moſt important ſucceſs, and which the Secretary of State at home, and my own judgement upon the ſpot, had deliberately approved.

It was not one province, but three, that I conceived we had reaſon to expect poſſeſſion of at the end of the year 1777. The firſt object was Philadelphia, a city from whence, by means of the River Delaware, the rebels drew the greateſt part of their ſupplies—the Capital of Pennſylvania—the Capital, as it were, and reſidence of the Congreſs in North-America, ſituated in one of the moſt fertile provinces of that Continent, and in which I include the three lower counties on Delaware. Added to Pennſylvania, I concluded that the arrival of the northern army at Albany, would have given us the province of New-York and the Jerſeys; all which events I was confident would lead to a proſperous concluſion of the war.

Early in July, 1777, I began the embarkation—I wiſhed however to remain until the arrival of Sir Henry Clinton from Europe, who was to command at New-York in my abſence; and until I ſhould learn ſomething of the progreſs of the northern army. On the 5th of July Sir Henry Clinton arrived, and on the 15th I received an expreſs from General Burgoyne, informing me of his ſucceſs at Ticonderoga, "that his army was in good "health, and that Ticonderoga would be garriſoned from Canada, "which would leave his force complete for further operations." In my anſwer I ſaid, that I expected General Waſhington would follow me to Pennſylvania, but that if, contrary to my expectation, he ſhould go northward, I ſhould ſoon be after him. It may alſo be proper in this place to advert to the inſtructions I left with Sir Henry Clinton, and to ſeveral of my ſubſequent letters to that General. As I omitted to ſend copies of them to the Secretary of State, they are not upon the table; but I have them

in my hand, and with leave of the Committee will read a ſhort extract of them.

Extract of Inſtructions from Sir William Howe *to* Sir Henry Clinton, *dated 9th July*, 1777.

" UPON my departure from hence with the army, " you will be pleaſed to take the command of the troops men- " tioned in the encloſed return, and of all other troops now here, " or that may arrive in my abſence. You will make ſuch " changes in the poſition of them as you may judge moſt con- " ducive to his majeſty's ſervice for the defence of this im- " portant poſt, and its Dependencies, whereby I would be under- " ſtood to include King's-Bridge, Long-Iſland, Staten-Iſland, " Paulus-Hook, and Sandy-Hook; at the ſame time it is by " no means my intention to prevent your acting offenſively, in " caſe an opportunity ſhould offer, conſiſtent with the ſecurity " of this place, as abovementioned, which is always to be " regarded as a primary object."

Extract of a Letter from Sir William Howe *to* Sir Henry Clinton, *dated 15th July*, 1777.

" I Have directed the 7th and 26th regiments of foot, " and Colonel D'Eib's regiment of Anſpach to remain here under " your orders, in addition to the troops of which you have re- " ceived a return, and am hopeful, if you ſee occaſion to act " offenſively, thoſe corps may prove of eſſential uſe.

" Upon the arrival of Major-General Sir Thomas Wilſon, " you will be pleaſed to order him to join me, unleſs from any " offenſive operations you may have in view at the time, you " ſhall find his preſence neceſſary for that ſervice, in which caſe " you will keep him under your command."

Extract of a Letter from Sir William Howe *to* Sir Henry Clinton, *dated off Delaware*, 30*th July*, 1777.

" IT is not poſſible for me to ſay at this time when I " ſhall be able to ſend re-inforcements to you, but I beg you

" may be aſſured I ſhall not fail to do it, as ſoon as expedient:
" In the mean while, if you can make any diverſion in favour
" of General Burgoyne's approaching Albany, with ſecurity to
" King's-Bridge, I need not point out the utility of ſuch a
" meaſure."

From theſe extracts it is to be obſerved, that I gave full power to Sir Henry Clinton to act offenſively, if opportunity ſhould offer, conſiſtent with the defence of New-York and its Dependencies, and that the facilitating the approach of the northern army, by a diverſion in its favour, if practicable, was not out of my thoughts, although I had received no inſtructions whatſoever upon that head.

The Committee will now permit me to ſtate the diſtribution of the whole army under my command, at the time of my departure to the ſouthward. For the defence of Rhode-Iſland there were about 3000 men; at New-York about 8500, excluſive of the ſick and convaleſcents of thoſe corps, and of the ſouthern army, and a ſmall body of militia upon Long-Iſland. Theſe two corps I judged to be not more than ſufficient for their ſituations at that time, eſpecially in the view of Sir Henry Clinton's acting upon occaſion, to a certain degree offenſively, in favour of the northern army—My own corps, to be oppoſed to the enemy's principal army, was nearly 14,000, and knowing General Waſhington to have about 15,000, excluſive of almoſt any number he pleaſed of militia, I could not think it adviſeable to weaken any of thoſe corps, by detaching from them for an expedition to the northward by ſea.

The embarkation being finiſhed, we ſailed from New-York the 23d of July, and arrived off the Delaware on the 30th. Several days muſt have been employed to ſurmount the difficulties of getting up the river, and I inferred from thence, that I ſhould not be able to land the troops before General Waſhington would be in force at Wilmington, where there was alſo a corps: There was beſides no proſpect of landing above the confluence of the Delaware and Chriſtiana-Creek, at leaſt the preparations the enemy had made for the defence of the river, by gallies, floating batteries, fireſhips, and fire rafts, would have made ſuch

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an attempt extremely hazardous. I had alſo to conſider that the country below, where the troops muſt have landed, and where only the tranſports could have laid in ſecurity, (I mean about Reedy-Iſland) was very marſhy, and the roads upon narrow cauſeways interſected by creeks: I therefore agreed with the Admiral to go up Cheſapeak Bay, a plan which had been preconcerted, in the event of a landing in the Delaware proving, upon our arrival there, ineligible. It is to be obſerved, that if we could not have landed above Wilmington we ſhould have been under the neceſſity of going the ſame route we took from the head of Elk, by way of Aikens's-Tavern, otherwiſe called Pencadder.

Our going up Cheſapeak-Bay alarmed the provinces of Virginia and Maryland, and diverted a body of their troops, which did not join General Waſhington until after the battle of Brandywine. Another circumſtance much in our favour attended this change: Our troops by being on board ſhip in the hot month of July and part of Auguſt, eſcaped an almoſt certain fatality by ſickneſs, in which the enemy ſuffered much at that time. But, for this I do not take credit, as I was anxious to get forward, and no delay aroſe from that conſideration. I will, however, declare it as my opinion, that in thoſe two months the troops ſhould be expoſed as little as poſſible in the field in America.

On the 16th of Auguſt we entered Cheſapeak-Bay, and there I received the Miniſter's letter of the 18th of May, 1777, wherein I am again told, that my laſt plan is approved, and in the ſame period, that he truſts "whatever I may meditate, it "will be executed in time for me to co-operate with the "northern army." Were I to be permitted to account for this expectation, I would ſay, it muſt have been founded upon an idea, that the poſſeſſion of that moſt important object, Philadelphia, was to be obtained without any great efforts of the enemy for its defence—At leaſt I muſt conclude the noble Lord apprehended none. The fact however is, that Mr. Waſhington oppoſed our progreſs with his whole force. It is alſo to be remarked, that, although the idea of going up Hudſon's-River had not entered into any of the reduced plans which I ſent home,

and which met with approbation, yet, in this letter, it is ſuggeſted, at a time when there could be no poſſibility of carrying it into execution, conſiſtently with the approved expedition I was then upon—I was now under the neceſſity of proceeding (*a*).

I paſs over the time between the landing of the army, near the head of Elk, and the battle of Brandywine. But underſtanding ſome fault has been attributed to me for making a diviſion of my force to bring on that action, I flatter myſelf it will not be thought impertinent to ſay a few words on that ſubject.

To bring the enemy to an action was my object, and being confident that General Waſhington was ſtudious to avoid it, unleſs under moſt favourable circumſtances, ſome art and ſome hazard was neceſſary to accompliſh my purpoſe.

The movements made on this occaſion, which may be found in my letter of the 10th of October, 1777, were not repugnant to ſound principles, and it is no ſmall conſolation to me to know, independent of the event, that I have the opinions of the moſt judicious officers in the army on the ſpot, to ſupport a meaſure which ſome gentlemen, from what authority I know not, have

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(*a*) Lord George Germain, in his anſwer to this part of my ſpeech, complained of my neglect of duty in point of correſpondence, by declaring that after I had embarked for Pennſylvania, two months elapſed without his hearing from me. I took the earlieſt opportunity of replying to this charge; the fact ſtands thus:—On the 16*th of July* I wrote to his lordſhip, informing him, that I propoſed going up the Delaware, in order to be nearer New-York than if I went up the Cheſapeak, *as I once intended*, and which route I preferred to that of the Delaware, provided the enemy diſcovered a diſpoſition to defend Pennſylvania. This letter was received by the noble lord on the 22d of Auguſt. My next letter was dated the 30*th of Auguſt*, from the head of Elk; but it happened that the Swallow packet, carrying that letter, had a very uncommon length of voyage, and did not reach England till the 28*th of October*, which accounts for his lordſhip's having been two months without hearing from me, my letter of the 16th of July having reached England on the 22d of Auguſt. The noble lord, when he was ſo unuſually long without receiving a letter from me, might have conjectured the poſſibility of a packet's having a tedious voyage; of its having been loſt; or of its having been taken by the enemy. Indeed, he might alſo have conjectured, from the words I have quoted in my letter of the 16th of July, that I was gone up the Cheſapeak, which would neceſſarily lengthen my voyage from New-York; and finally he ought to have compared the dates of the letters themſelves, and not the dates of their arrival.

been pleaſed to cenſure. But at the ſame time that I am reflected upon on one hand, for hazarding too much, I am blamed on the other, for not making the action more deciſive, and for not following up the victory more cloſely.

To demonſtrate the impracticability of a vigorous purſuit in a hoſtile country (but more particularly in America than in any other country I have ſeen) or the inutility of attempting it farther than was done, in the peculiar ſtate of the army at that time, would be treſpaſſing too much upon the indulgence of the Committee. I flatter myſelf it will ſuffice to ſay, that from a due regard to the wounded, the importance of poſſeſſing the poſt at Wilmington for their accommodation, and for the ſecurity of the priſoners, no movement could have been made ſooner, or more effectual, under ſuch circumſtances, than the advance of the two corps with Major-General Grant and Lord Cornwallis towards Cheſter; and I muſt be allowed to inſiſt there was no avoidable delay in the approach to Philadelphia by Valley Forge, the Schuylkill, by the nearer route through Derby, being impaſſable; nor any opportunity loſt of bringing the enemy to farther action between Dilworth and German-Town. This I nearly effected on the 17th of September when he was upon his march on the Lancaſter road, but the extreme violence of the weather rendered every effort to get forward impracticable. They had therefore an opportunity of evading the approach of the King's army, by a forced march into a very rough mountainous country, where it was certain they could not be followed. But my endeavours to get at the enemy, whatever was thought by thoſe actually engaged in them, have been treated here as ill-judged, feebly proſecuted, and void of enterpriſe, which laſt cenſure has been even extended to the general conduct during my command.

I ſhall not deſcend to minute refutations, but I beg leave to ſay, and I aſſert it with firmneſs, that almoſt every movement of the war in North-America was an act of enterpriſe, clogged with innumerable difficulties. A knowledge of the country, interſected, as it every where is, by woods, mountains, waters, or moraſſes, cannot be obtained with any degree of preciſion neceſſary to foreſee, and guard againſt, the obſtructions that may occur.

In a word, Sir, whatever may be the aim or wiſh of my enemies in propagating theſe aſperſions, it is from my conſcience I affirm to this Committee, and to my country at large, that I never neglected an opportunity of bringing the enemy to action, where it could have been done upon a comparative view of all circumſtances at the time, and conſiſtent with the caution indiſpenſably requiſite in a ſituation always ſo critical, that a material check to his Majeſty's arms might have been productive of fatal conſequences to the intereſts of this country in America.

The next point is the attack made upon the King's army at German-Town on the 4th of October, which has been maliciouſly repreſented as a ſurpriſe, thereby throwing a ſtigma upon the vigilance of the troops, but more particularly upon that of the General.

The circumſtances which encouraged the enemy to make this attack are ſet forth in my letter of the 10th of October, 1777, as well as the reaſons for making the detachments which cauſed that encouragement. In addition to the account there given, I beg leave to inform the Committee, that my firſt poſition at German-Town was taken to cover Philadelphia, during the operations carrying on againſt Mud-Iſland, and was therefore more extended than it otherwiſe would have been. It is true, however, that I did not expect the enemy would have dared to approach after ſo recent a defeat as that at Brandywine.

In this Idea I did not direct any redoubts to be raiſed for the ſecurity of the camp or out-poſts, nor did I ever encourage the conſtruction of them at the head of the line when in force, becauſe works of that kind are apt to induce an opinion of inferiority, and my wiſh was, to ſupport by every means the acknowledged ſuperiority of the King's troops over the enemy, which I conſidered more peculiarly eſſential, where ſtrength was not to be eſtimated by numbers, ſince the enemy in that reſpect, by calling in the force of the country upon any emergence, muſt have been ſuperior.

I confeſs alſo it was for the above reaſons I did not change my poſition, after making the detachments beforementioned, chooſing rather to truſt to the well-tried vigilance of the troops,

and the activity of the patroles (though I had intimation that an attack might be made) than to give the army unneceſſary fatigue, by making more cautionary preparations.

In my confidence in the troops I was not diſappointed; the enemy's approach was diſcovered by our patroles, and I had early notice of it. The line was preſently under arms, and although it muſt be admitted that the out-poſts and light-infantry in one quarter, were driven back, it muſt be equally admitted, that they were ſoon effectually ſupported, and the enemy repulſed from the only place where the ſmalleſt impreſſion was made.

I cannot mention this tranſaction without paying a due acknowledgement to an excellent officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Muſgrave, whoſe gallant and judicious conduct, upon this occaſion, will, I hope, ſome day meet with its reward.

I have ſtated theſe facts, in addition to the account in my letter upon the table, principally to ſhew, that how much ſoever I may be ſuppoſed to have erred in my own conjecture, the imputation of the army being unguarded or ſurpriſed is not founded in truth.

On the 19th of October I found it adviſeable to remove to Philadelphia, to expedite the reduction of Mud-Iſland, which proved to be more difficult than was at firſt ſuppoſed. To this end the poſſeſſion of Red-Bank on the Eaſt ſide of the Delaware engaged my attention. The event of that enterpriſe is contained in my letter of the 25th of October, 1777, but as I underſtand that a pointed reference was made to it in this Houſe, laſt year, by the noble Lord in the American department, I ſhall briefly ſtate, to the beſt of my recollection, the circumſtances under which Colonel Donop, a brave and gallant officer, was detached on this ſervice. He earneſtly intreated Lord Cornwallis, in whoſe corps he ſerved, to expreſs his wiſhes for an opportunity to ſignalize himſelf, and the Heſſian troops under his command. My deſign on Red-Bank affording the earlieſt opportunity, I deſired Lord Cornwallis to explain the nature of the ſervice, and if it ſhould meet with his approbation, to offer him the command, which he very readily accepted. On the evening of his departure Colonel Donop deſired to know from

Lord Cornwallis, if it was expected he ſhould make the attack at all hazards, when Lord Cornwallis aſſured him from me, that he was to be guided by his own judgement on the ſpot, but that the attack was to be made, unleſs he ſaw good reaſon to the contrary. If I may conclude from the manner in which I parted with Colonel Donop, or from the approbation the directions given to him received from his immediate and moſt valuable commander, General Knyphauſen, I have every reaſon to believe he went upon the ſervice perfectly ſatisfied.

The Committee will do me the juſtice to believe I have no other motive for this explanation than to make known what really paſſed with reſpect to the orders given to Colonel Donop upon this enterpriſe. The intrepidity and vigour with which it was attempted, reflect the higheſt honour upon the commander and his troops, and the loſs ſuſtained upon the occaſion cannot be too much regretted.

It has been aſſerted, that an early poſſeſſion of Red-Bank muſt have been immediately followed by the reduction of Mud-Iſland, to which I in ſome meaſure agree, that is to ſay, after the enemy had put it in a ſtate of defence: Before that time ſuch a corps as could have been ſpared from the army, muſt have been eſtabliſhed and ſupplied with ſtores and proviſions, with great difficulty, while expoſed to the annoyance of the armed gallies and floating batteries; and before the army was drawn nearer to Philadelphia, the ſupport of a poſt, ſo detached, would have been very precarious.

I muſt nevertheleſs acknowledge my great diſappointment in the time that proved neceſſary for the reduction of Mud-Iſland; but if the violent rains, by filling the trenches, and ſapping the foundations of the batteries, had not cauſed a conſiderable delay in the deſtruction of the enemy's defences, which prevented an earlier co-operation of the ſhips of war, I probably ſhould have been much leſs deceived in my expectations.

My diſpatch of the 13th of December, 1777, reſpecting the movement to White-Marſh, and my conduct on that occaſion, is ſo explicit as to make farther obſervations unneceſſary.—The motives from which I acted at that time were, I think, juſt, and if

if they appear inconcluſive to any here, I can only eſteem myſelf unfortunate in the want of their concurrence.

The activity of the army during the winter is undeniably proved by my ſubſequent letters: But as many of the tranſactions were in their effects leſs important to the grand object than to the credit of the troops, the moſt material only were ſpecified in my diſpatches.

The entrenched ſituation of the enemy at Valley-Forge, twenty-two miles from Philadelphia, did not occaſion any difficulties ſo preſſing as to juſtify an attack upon that ſtrong poſt during the ſevere weather, and though every thing was prepared with that intention, I judged it imprudent, until the ſeaſon ſhould afford a proſpect of reaping the advantages, that ought to have reſulted from ſucceſs in that meaſure; but having good information in the ſpring that the enemy had ſtrengthened the camp by additional works, and being certain of moving him from thence when the campaign ſhould open, I dropped all thoughts of an attack. My letter of the 19th of April, 1778, gives further reaſons for this part of my conduct.

From the remainder of my correſpondence, gentlemen muſt have ſeen, that I continued my remonſtrance for more troops. Perhaps it was impoſſible for the Miniſter to ſend more.—Such an acknowledgement would have been no reflection upon himſelf, and would have relieved my mind from the uneaſineſs it laboured under, in conceiving, that my opinions of the neceſſity of reinforcements were deemed nugatory; and that, of courſe, I had loſt the confidence of thoſe, who were in the firſt inſtance to judge of my conduct. It cannot be ſurpriſing, that finding myſelf in this ſituation, I deſired his Majeſty's permiſſion to withdraw from the command.—I gave the true reaſon for that requeſt—the loſs of confidence.—The reaſon was tacitly acknowledged to be well founded, for it was acquieſced in; and his Majeſty was pleaſed to appoint a ſucceſſor to the command of the army.

With regard to the complaint I made of the loſs of confidence, the noble Lord in the American department muſt have done great injuſtice to my ſenſibility, when he expreſſed an opinion,

opinion, upon a former occaſion, that I alluded merely to the ſlight put upon my recommendations; not but that I confeſs I was mortified to find, that brave officers, whoſe eminent ſervices I had ſtrongly and faithfully repreſented, were not rewarded at home with the diſtinction expected for them by the army in general, as well as by me. It were a matter of ſmall moment if the evil went no farther than to my perſonal mortification: but if it be true that the ſpirit of military men is raiſed or depreſſed by the conferring or with-holding of their Sovereign's ſubſtantial approbation, ſuch ſlights may prove of very dangerous tendency.

The noble Lord, on a former day, thought proper to treat my recommendation of Captain Emmerrick with a certain air of contempt and ridicule. He had forgot, it ſhould ſeem, that he himſelf ſent Captain Emmerrick to America, and, in the very extraordinary terms contained in his Lordſhip's letter of the 25th of April, 1776, originally recommended him to my attention. His Lordſhip beſt knows the purpoſe for which he ſent him out, and whether he was a proper perſon to raiſe a body of men, or to be truſted with money for ſuch a ſervice.

When I received my orders to return home, as ſoon as Sir Henry Clinton ſhould arrive at Philadelphia, I confeſs I became cautious of hazarding exploits which might have reduced the army of my ſucceſſor, though a fair opportunity happening to preſent itſelf, I did make one attempt, which, had it ſucceeded, would have proved a ſevere ſtroke upon the enemy. Upon the whole, I flatter myſelf it will be found, that I made no diſadvantageous uſe of the army under my command, and that I never made deceitful repreſentations of the ſituation of affairs, but freely communicated my ſentiments upon the force neceſſary to ſuppreſs the rebellion: and I am to this hour confident that if ſufficient re-inforcements had been ſent from hence, and the plan of operations which I took upon me to propoſe, had been adopted in its proper extent, the war in North America would now have worn a very different aſpect.

I have heard it has been ſaid, that my civil commiſſion was inconſiſtent with my military command,—and that my mind was more intent upon bringing about a peace by negociation, than by force

force of arms. Sir, thinking it my firſt duty, I certainly ſhould have preferred the former mode of conciliation, and my brother and I for that purpoſe did go to the utmoſt verge of our very limited commiſſion and inſtructions. But our proceedings in the character of Commiſſioners never for one moment ſuſpended our military operations. We ſoon ſaw that the leaders of the rebellion were determined, from intereſt, if not from principle, to prevent a reconciliation with Great-Britain, and therefore our joint endeavours were invariably exerted in the proſecution of the war, to as great an extent as the force in our hands would permit.

The reflection, that the civil and the military commiſſion were incompatible, has, I know, been applied particularly to my conduct. I boldly aſſert it to be ill founded, as I am certain I never delayed to ſeize an opportunity of attacking the enemy, conſiſtently with my duty of weighing the riſk of ruining the cauſe I was engaged in by a conſiderable loſs of troops: and indeed thoſe who are acquainted with my commiſſion and inſtructions, as a Commiſſioner of peace, muſt know, that from the reſtrictions they contained, it was next to an impoſſibility, that my military could materially interfere with my civil duty.

I have treſpaſſed, I fear, too long upon the patience of the Committee—The great importance of the ſubject, and the detail of facts, I have been neceſſarily led into, will, I hope, plead my apology. I ſhall trouble you with but a word more; in ſupport of the meaſure of proceeding to Philadelphia. Before I came from thence, I had every reaſon to be perfectly ſatisfied of the advantages that would have enſued from that operation, if the councils at home had thought the Poſt proper to be preſerved. The inhabitants in general of the province of Pennſylvania, thoſe of the lower counties on Delaware, and thoſe of the lower part of Jerſey, were forward to return to their allegiance, and even to aſſiſt offenſively in compelling his Majeſty's revolted ſubjects to their duty. This favourable diſpoſition, however did not appear immediately—An equivocal neutrality was all I at firſt experienced; our ſucceſſes and apparent ability to retain our advantages, induced the inhabitants at laſt to be leſs reſerved. Secret intelligence, which, until that period, had been extremely difficult

difficult to procure, was then ſo good, and ſo readily obtained, that I could not but attribute it to the poſſeſſion of Philadelphia, which convinced the country of the ſuperiority, and perſuaded them of the eſtabliſhed power, of his Majeſty's arms. The difficulties of the Congreſs, in raiſing ſupplies, and in recruiting Mr. Waſhington's army, then indeed became real, and had the appearance of being unſurmountable. But the French treaty, and our orders to evacuate Philadelphia, by which meaſure the protection of his Majeſty's forces was to be withdrawn from the province, made a ſudden and melancholy change in our affairs. The rebels were inſpired with freſh hopes; the friends of government were diſmayed.—But it is not my intention to animadvert upon orders ſent from hence after my recall, nor upon the future proſpects of the war.—My view is merely to juſtify my own conduct during the time I was honoured with the command (*a*).

This Narrative has, I fear, been too prolix; but the ſubject was ſo complicated with matter, and the circumſtances neceſſary to be brought into a clear point of view, were ſo numerous, that brevity would not have been conſiſtent with perſpicuity. Had I laboured to make my Narrative ſhort, it would have been obſcure. Senſible as I am of the great attention and indulgence with which the Committee has honoured me, I now haſten to the concluſion.

The Secretary of State, as appears in his letters, has ſignified in the moſt flattering expreſſions, his Majeſty's approbation of every material part of my conduct, during the whole of my command. His Lordſhip's own perſonal applauſe is alſo very warmly conveyed throughout his correſpondence; all his letters,

(*a*) Mr. Joſeph Galloway, in his evidence to the Committee of the Houſe of Commons, poſitively aſſerts, that I adviſed him, and the other magiſtrates, to go over to Waſhington, and make their peace. The truth is, as ſoon as it was known that orders were arrived for the evacuation of Philadelphia, Mr. Galloway came to me on behalf of himſelf and the other magiſtrates, and requeſted my advice and aſſiſtance concerning the meaſures to be adopted for their welfare. I aſſured him, that if they choſe to go with the King's army, they ſhould be taken all poſſible care of; but if they rather choſe to ſtay behind with their property and families, I could have no objection to their enquiring previouſly whether Waſhington and the Congreſs would grant them protection and ſecurity.

however, may with propriety be ſaid to have been private letters, until they were laid before this Houſe. The knowledge of the approbation they contained was confined within his Lordſhip's breaſt and mine. When calumny firſt became buſy with my reputation, I could have wiſhed his Lordſhip's ſentiments more generally known;—though it would not perhaps have become me to have obtruded upon the world thoſe official declarations in my own favour. But I muſt ever think it would have been an ingenuous, an honourable, and a liberal part in the noble Lord, to have avowed, openly in Parliament, the approbation, which it is to be preſumed he was convinced I deſerved, becauſe he had adviſed the King to beſtow it. Such a conduct would have ſtopped the current of ill-founded accuſations againſt me. Such a conduct would have ſecured to himſelf the confidence, and to his country the chearful ſervices, of future Generals.

And now, Sir, having endeavoured to bring before you, by the moſt impartial quotations, all the evidence that I thought neceſſary to collect from the papers on your table, I ſhall only remind you, that the Houſe has ordered the attendance of ſeveral of the moſt reſpectable officers who ſerved in America during my command. Their teſtimony may confirm the truth of the facts I have advanced, and will undoubtedly explain and prove any other material circumſtances, which you may think neceſſary for your inveſtigation.

And, Sir, if the Houſe of Commons, or any individual member, ſhall have any charge or accuſation to make againſt me, I declare myſelf ready and willing to meet it. The Committee is open for the reception of any other papers, and for the examination of any other witneſſes. My only wiſh is, that every poſſible light may be thrown upon every part of my conduct.

I move that Earl Cornwallis be called in.

OBSERVATIONS

UPON

A PAMPHLET

ENTITLED

LETTERS TO A NOBLEMAN.

LETTER TO A NORGEMAN

UPON

THE LATE

OBSERVATIONS

OBSERVATIONS

UPON

A PAMPHLET, &c.

THE Author of LETTERS TO A NOBLEMAN, upon whoſe invidious aſſertions I mean to make ſome obſervations, opens his pamphlet againſt me with a compariſon between the preſent and the laſt war in America.

Without meaning to depreciate the great ſervices of former Commanders, I muſt take leave to ſay, that the two wars, with reſpect to the ſtate of the country of America, are in no degree ſimilar. In the laſt war, the difficulties ariſing from the ſtrength of the country were, for the moſt part, removed by the friendly diſpoſition of the inhabitants, who always exerted themſelves to facilitate the operations of the King's army, and to ſupply them with every neceſſary and accommodation.

In the preſent war, theſe circumſtances are reverſed; and yet the author attempts to perſuade his reader, that "the ſtrength "or impracticability of America is loſt in idea, when we com-"pare it with the ſcene of action in the laſt American war."

Becauſe the Britiſh troops were always ſuperiour to the rebels in diſcipline, and frequently in numbers, he is unwilling to allow them any merit in the victories they obtained; for he

denies that they had ſtrength of country to contend againſt. " That part of the middle colonies (ſays he page 2d) which has " been the ſcene of the late military operations, cannot, with " the leaſt propriety, in the military ſenſe of the words, be " called uncommonly ſtrong; and much leſs impracti- " cable."

This aſſertion is in direct oppoſition to the opinions of Earl Cornwallis, Major General Grey, and every military man I ever converſed with on the ſubject, who have been eye-witneſſes, and ſerving in this war.

Major-General Grey's evidence upon this point to the Houſe of Commons, is as follows:

Q. " Is not the country in general ſo covered with wood, " and ſo favourable to ambuſcades, that but an imperfect know- " ledge of it can be obtained by reconnoitering?"

A. " That part of America, where I have been, is the " ſtrongeſt country I ever was in; it is every where hilly, and " covered with wood—interſected by ravines, creeks, and marſhy " grounds, and in every quarter of a mile is a poſt fitted for " ambuſcades. Little or no knowledge could be obtained by " reconnoitering."

Q. " Do you know any country, conſidering the circum- " ſtances of the American war, ſo well calculated for the de- " fenſive?"

A. " My anſwer to the former queſtion certainly ſhews, that " America is, of all countries, the beſt calculated for the de- " fenſive. Every one hundred yards might be diſputed; at " leaſt that part of it which I have ſeen."

I ſhall now proceed with my remarks upon the pamphlet, page by page.

Page 3d.] *In this country, we have lately ſeen two armies, one meditating its conqueſt, the other its defence. We have ſeen the Britiſh army penetrating into its heart, in a circuit of near two hundred miles, from Long-Iſland, by the White Plains, to Trenton, and from the Elk Ferry to Philadelphia, in defiance of the utmoſt efforts*

efforts of an enemy perfectly acquainted with every advantageous ſpot of ground; and we have ſeen that army taking, with eaſe, and little loſs, every ſtrong poſt poſſeſſed by the enemy, who have always fled at its approach.

This Deſcription is introduced to ſhew that the country is not *very ſtrong and impracticable.* But it only proves, that the Generals, and officers commanding the ſeveral corps, were indefatigable in their duty, and ſurmounted all the difficulties of country which they met with in thoſe marches. The author certainly did not mean to pay me any compliment. The Commander in Chief, however, will be ſuppoſed to have had ſome ſhare in the merit of theſe ſucceſſes—But it is not true, that *the enemy always fled at our approach,* nor that we took all their ſtrong poſts *with eaſe and little loſs.* They fought the King's army on Long-Iſland; they ſuſtained the attack at Fort Waſhington; they ſtood the battle of Brandywine; and our loſs upon thoſe occaſions, though by no means equal to theirs, was not inconſiderable.

Page 7, 8, &c.] *Theſe pages contain a diſſertation upon the loyalty of the people of America.*

Much might be ſaid upon the ſtate of loyalty, and the principles of loyalty, in America. Some are loyal from principle; many from intereſt; many from reſentment; many wiſh for peace, but are indifferent which ſide prevails; and there are others who wiſh ſucceſs to Great-Britain, from a recollection of the happineſs they enjoyed under her government. In the courſe of theſe remarks I ſhall have occaſion to treat this ſubject more at large.

Page 8.] *Neglect and inhuman treatment which his Majeſty's faithful ſubjects received.*

I am at a loſs to know what ſpecies of neglect, or inhuman treatment, is here meant. Plundering is particularly ſtated in another part of the pamphlet, and ſhall be there anſwered. Upon this general accuſation, however, I cannot help making ſome remarks.—I am contented that ſtrictures ſhould be made upon my

profeſſional conduct; but I feel myſelf hurt as a man, when I am accuſed of inhumanity.

The firſt diſtreſſes to the Americans, in conſequence of the rebellion, commenced in Boſton; and I believe it impoſſible to give one inſtance of inhumanity towards any individual in that place. The utmoſt attention was, on the contrary, extended, not only to thoſe whoſe conduct gave them a claim to public protection, but to all who made even the ſlighteſt profeſſions, or aſſumed the appearance, of loyalty. It is upon record (Proclamation of 28th October, 1775) that their ſervices were courted, by recommending a defenſive aſſociation, and that arms were offered to all, who would declare themſelves willing to contribute their aſſiſtance in the preſervation of good order and government within the town of Boſton: thoſe, who enrolled themſelves upon this occaſion, were ſupplied with fuel and proviſions, equal to the allowance iſſued to his majeſty's troops. A ſimilar regard was continued to the refugees upon the evacuation of Boſton (when the army was in the moſt perilous circumſtances, as well from a ſcarcity of proviſions as of tranſport tonnage) by carrying to Halifax above 1100 men, women, and children, with as much of their merchandiſe and effects as could be removed. Does this treatment come under the deſcription of inhumanity?—The circumſtances I have mentioned are upon record in my letters to Lord George Germain of the 21ſt of March, and 25th of April, 1776.

At every other period of my command, at New-York, at Philadelphia, was there a man, having a juſt claim to notice, and offering his active ſervices, who was not employed? Many were provided for in civil departments; many received pecuniary reliefs; nor do I recollect a refugee (properly recommended to me) who was not offered military ſervice, civil employment, money, proviſions, accommodations, or ſome mark of public attention. It is true that I particularly diſtinguiſhed (as I had a right to do) thoſe from whom I had reaſon to expect the more eſſential ſervices; and I confeſs that I ſometimes found myſelf the dupe of ſuch diſtinctions.

Of this I ſhall ſtate one particular inſtance.—*Joſeph Galloway*, Eſq. (a lawyer by profeſſion) had been formerly Speaker of the Aſſembly of Pennſylvania. This gentleman, in the beginning of the rebellion, was elected a member of Congreſs. When my Brother and I, in the Character of his Majeſty's Commiſſioners for reſtoring Peace, publiſhed a Proclamation of indemnity for all thoſe who had taken part in the rebellion, provided they ſhould ſurrender themſelves, and ſubſcribe a declaration of allegiance, within a limited time, *Mr. Galloway* was amongſt the firſt who came over to us, from Philadelphia. This was in the month of December, 1776, when our great ſucceſſes had intimidated the leaders of the rebellion, and nearly induced a general ſubmiſſion. Notwithſtanding ſo favourable a proſpect of affairs, I conſidered the acquiſition of *Mr. Galloway* as a matter of ſome importance, becauſe in all events I expected much aſſiſtance from a gentleman of his abilities and reputed influence in the province of Pennſylvania. This expectation will, I hope, in ſome degree juſtify my liberality towards him. I allowed him at the rate of 200l. ſterling per annum from the time of his joining the army until he could be otherwiſe provided for. When we had taken poſſeſſion of Philadelphia, I appointed him a Magiſtrate of the police of that city, with a ſalary made up 300l. ſterling per annum, and ſix ſhillings a day more, for a clerk. I alſo appointed him Superintendent of the Port, with a ſalary of twenty ſhillings a day, making in the whole upwards of 770l. ſterling per annum. Had his popularity, or perſonal influence in Pennſylvania, been as great as he pretended it was, I ſhould not have thought this money ill beſtowed. I at firſt paid attention to his opinions, and relied upon him for procuring me ſecret intelligence; but I afterwards found that my confidence was miſplaced. His ideas, I diſcovered, to be viſionary, and his intelligence was too frequently either ill founded, or ſo much exaggerated, that it would have been unſafe to act upon it. Having once detected him in ſending me a piece of intelligence from a perſon, who afterwards, upon examination, gave a very different account of the matter, I immediately changed the channel of ſecret communication, and in future conſidered *Mr. Galloway*, as a nugatory informer. I continued him, however, in his lucrative offices of

Magiſtrate of the police, and Superintendent of the port, in the duties of which I believe he was not deficient.

Pages 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27.] *The author in theſe pages ſays, that the Britiſh army, wherever they marched, were received with every mark of gladneſs, and particularly in Philadelphia—that during our poſſeſſion of Philadelphia the people of the country, at the riſque of their lives, ſupplied the army, the navy, and the inhabitants of the city, conſiſting of not leſs than* 50,000 *ſouls, with every kind of proviſion—that they refuſed thoſe ſupplies to the rebel general, rather than be the inſtruments of aiding the enemies of their ſovereign—that they came in from all quarters to give intelligence of the ſtate of the enemy, and of the good diſpoſition of the people towards government—that many thouſands came over to the Britiſh troops for protection, or concealed themſelves in diſtant provinces, where they were unknown; or took refuge among the ſavages, to avoid entering into the war againſt their fellow-ſubjects in this country; and at the ſame time thouſands of them in arms as* volunteers *ſerved in their behalf without receiving pay or clothing.*

I know not, nor ever heard, that the Britiſh troops, wherever they marched, and particularly in Philadelphia, were received with gladneſs, except by the Quakers, and a very few other perſons. Upon the arrival of the army at Philadelphia, there were not quite 4,500 male inhabitants between eighteen and ſixty years of age remaining in that city. By degrees they came in, ſome to get poſſeſſion of their houſes and effects—ſome to do us all the miſchief they could, by ſending out intelligence to the enemy, inveigling the troops to deſert, and ſmuggling ſuch ſupplies for Waſhington's army as could not be purchaſed in the country. That the people of the country brought in freſh proviſions to us, and refuſed ſuch ſupplies, as much as they dared, to the rebel General, is certain; but I do not admit that this conduct proceeded from the motives aſcribed to it by the author. The people of the country had no opinion of the value of Congreſs paper money; and the rebel General compelled them to take that in payment for the ſupplies he collected. But they knew they ſhould receive inſtantly hard money for every thing they ſhould bring to us; and they had alſo the opportunity of carrying

back with them, for the uſe of their families, a variety of neceſſary articles, that could only be had in thoſe places which were poſſeſſed by the Britiſh army and navy. Theſe, I apprehend, were the real motives of all that ſort of aſſiſtance which we procured from the country people. The author ſays they did this at the *riſque of their lives*. There was in fact that appearance, and I regularly ſent out conſiderable detachments to protect the ingreſs and regreſs of the people on market days; but I always ſuſpected that General Waſhington, through policy, connived at this kind of commerce. He knew that neither our army nor our navy were ever in diſtreſs for proviſions: he knew that diſtreſs, if any, would fall upon the inhabitants, who were in general his friends: he knew that an influx of gold and ſilver was ſtrengthening his country in a moſt important point; and he knew that the people, whether he ſhould connive at the practice or not, would carry their produce wherever they could get gold and ſilver in payment.

Many thouſands (the author ſays) *concealed themſelves in diſtant provinces where they were unknown, or took refuge amongſt the ſavages, to avoid entering into the war.*

If by this he means (as I preſume he muſt) the inſurgents of *North Carolina*, the reader will find the circumſtances reſpecting them related in a ſubſequent remark.

Many thouſands (he ſays) *came over to the Britiſh troops for protection.*

I aver, that at no time did men in numbers come over to the Britiſh troops, although there was a proſpect of that happening in the ſpring of 1778, which I attributed to our ſucceſs in taking, and retaining poſſeſſion of, Philadelphia.

What the author means by thouſands of *volunteers* in arms, without receiving pay or clothing, I know not. I know that of the whole number of the men in our provincial corps, only a ſmall proportion were Americans.

Soon after the arrival of the army in Philadelphia, *Mr. Galloway* applied to me for permiſſion to raiſe a troop of dragoons,

which he aſſured me ſhould be compoſed of natives of America, and chiefly from the county of Bucks in Pennſylvania, where he pretended to have (for he certainly had not) great influence. His requeſt was granted; and afterwards, upon examination, it turned out that very few of the men he did raiſe were Americans.

To prove my opinion of the loyalty of the people, the author, in a note (page 24) quotes a paſſage in my letter of the 3d of September, 1776, to the ſecretary of ſtate, wherein I ſay, that "the inhabitants of Long-Iſland, many of whom *had been forced* "*into the rebellion*, have all *ſubmitted*, and are ready to take the "oaths of allegiance."

My information, that many of the inhabitants of Long-Iſland had been forced into the rebellion, came from the Governor of the province; and it is true, that after our ſucceſs there the inhabitants did ſubmit; but it appeared in the ſequel, that their ſubmiſſion proceeded from no other motive, than that of our ſucceſs, as few of them entered into the battalions then raiſing upon Long-Iſland. The word *ſubmitted*, in my letter, implies a degree of compulſion.

The author (in the ſame note) endeavouring to ſhew, that I thought the people not inclined to the rebellion, quotes the following words in my public letter of the 12th of February, 1777. "They (the Rebel States) conſcious that their whole "ſtake depends upon the ſucceſs of the next campaign, uſe "*every compulſory means* to thoſe who do not enter *voluntarily* "into their ſervice." He alſo quotes my letter of the 5th of March, 1778, to the like effect.

The *compulſory means*, to which I ſaid the Rebel States were reduced, was in fact the conſequence of the ſucceſs of the Britiſh arms. The Americans would not *voluntarily* enter into that army, which, whenever it met ours, was almoſt certain of being defeated. If the averſion which the Americans ſhewed to enter into the rebel army proceeded from loyalty to their Sovereign, why did not that body of 500 men, which the author aſſerts (but which I do not believe) were, in September 1777, diſmiſſed by General Waſhington, becauſe they were too much attached to

the Britiſh government, why did not that body, when ſo diſmiſſed, at the diſtance of a very few miles from our army, take an opportunity of offering their ſervices to us?

Page 33.] *The foot and cavalry ſent over to America amounted to* 52,815—*of that number* 40,874 *were under the command of Sir William Howe.*

The author would here impreſs the reader with an opinion, that at the time of my arrival at Staten-Iſland, my army amounted to 40,874, and the rebel army to 18,000, militia included. Nothing can be more fallacious than this account.—When I landed upon Staten-Iſland I had under my immediate command, including ſick, only 7,556 rank and file. I landed upon Long-Iſland with between 15 and 16,000, rank and file, having left the remainder of the army for the defence of Staten-Iſland; my whole force at that time conſiſted of 20,121 rank and file, of which 1,677 were ſick.

Page 34.] *When Sir William Howe arrived at Staten-Iſland, the reſolutions of Congreſs, recommending independence to the colonies, had juſt paſſed, &c.*

The Rebel force which had been ſeduced into arms, under a pretence of obtaining a redreſs of grievances, did not amount to 18,000 *men, militia included.*

Having thus before us the number of troops of both parties, it is neceſſary, to a further elucidation of the truth, to take a comparative view of the real force of each in the military balance.

The rebels, from the beſt information I could obtain, had then, in that part of the country, upwards of 20,000—they were called 24,000—I mean upon Long-Iſland and York-Iſland only, excluſive of what they called their flying camp in the neighbourhood (in the Jerſeys) ſaid to conſiſt of 8,000. If I were to follow the author's mode of computation, when he ſtates the number of men under my command, I ſhould ſay, and from better authority, that General Waſhington had under his command,

mand, in May 1776, in the ſeveral provinces, an army of 80,300 Men (*a*).

Page 35.] *The rebel army were neglected in their health, and undiſciplined.*

The truth is, that inſtead of being neglected in their health, they had the moſt eminent of the faculty in America to attend them, and had regular eſtabliſhed hoſpitals. With regard to their diſcipline, they had as good uſe of fire-arms, in general, as the King's troops, great pains having been taken to train their men ever ſince the year 1774.

Page 35.] *Another matter, which has long been a queſtion with the publick, ought to be cleared up—I mean, whether the General commanding the Britiſh troops has been confined by peremptory inſtructions, which weakened his operations, and obſtructed the great deſign of the war.—The letters of the American Secretaries of State prove, that he was left to his own judgement in forming and executing his plans in every inſtance, except one (d), which he unfortunately neglected, and by that neglect ſacrificed a Britiſh army, and involved his country in a degree of diſgrace it never before had experienced.*

(*d*) *Theſe inſtructions,* (the author ſays) *were, to ſupport the northern army, and to make a diverſion in its favour on the New-England coaſts.—Lord George Germain's letter, 3d March, 1777.*

I never complained of being confined by peremptory inſtructions. My operations were weakened, and the great deſign of

(*a*) *A Return of the Rebel Strength in May, 1776, printed at New-York, was thus.*

In Canada, on the lakes, and at Albany	-	9,000 Continental.
At New-York and Long-Iſland.		12,000 Ditto. 11,000 Militia. 3,300 Jerſey brigade.
In Jerſey and Pennſylvania	- -	10,000 Flying Camp.
In Virginia	- - -	8,000 Continental.
North-Carolina	- - -	1,000 Ditto.
South-Carolina	- - -	4,000 Ditto.
At Boſton	- - -	2,000 Ditto.
Not then ſtationed.	- - -	20,000 Militia.
	Total.	80,300

of the war was obſtructed, by a want of ſufficient force, as I have explained at large in my Narrative. The author here quotes Lord George Germain's letter of the 3d of March, 1777, as containing inſtructions *to ſupport the northern army*, although in fact it makes no mention whatſoever of that army. The only inſtructions, (if they can be ſo called) which I ever received concerning the northern army, are contained in his Lordſhip's letter to me of the 18th of May 1777, which I did not receive till the 16th of Auguſt, when I was up Cheſapeak-Bay—the words are theſe; "truſting however that whatever you may meditate, it "will be executed in time for you to co-operate with the army "ordered to proceed from Canada, and put itſelf under your "command."—I have ſpoken to this in my Narrative (page 24).

In the letter of the 3d of March (referred to by the author) I am informed that it is his Majeſty's opinion, that "a warm "diverſion upon the coaſts of Maſſachuſett's-Bay and New-"Hampſhire would not only impede the levies for the conti-"nental army, but tend much to the ſecurity of our trade,"—and Lord Howe and I are ordered to "take this matter into our "ſerious conſideration, ſo far as my intended plan" (the expedition to Pennſylvania) will admit."—In my anſwer to Lord George Germain of the 3d of June following, I gave my reaſons why that diverſion could not be made.—This ſubject is diſcuſſed in my Narrative (page 12). And here I will only farther obſerve, that the diverſion propoſed, in Lord George's letter, does not profeſs to have any reference to the northern army.

Page 36.] *The Commander in Chief never began his operations till the month of June. A part of that month, and the whole of April and May, when the ſeaſon is moderate, moſt proper for action, and the roads are good, were wantonly waſted; while a variety of the moſt cogent motives pointed to an early and vigorous campaign.*

I have the opening of two campaigns to account for.

On the 2d of July 1776 I landed at Staten-Iſland, from Halifax. Our operations were not expected to commence before the arrival of the troops from England, or of General Clinton's army from Charles-Town. General Clinton arrived the 1ſt of Auguſt.

The

The Guards and Heſſians, with the camp equipage, arrived the 12th of Auguſt. Nine days only were allotted for the refreſhment of the troops after the great length of time they had been on board their tranſports, and for making all neceſſary arrangements. We landed on Long-Iſland the 22d of Auguſt. This was the opening of the firſt campaign, 1776, nor could it poſſibly have been opened ſooner.

The ſecond campaign in 1777 is next to be accounted for.—The expedition to Peek's-Kill took place ſo early as the 22d of March. The expedition to Danbury on the 23d of April. The camp equipage for the army did not arrive till the 24th of May. Our operations in the Jerſeys began the 12th of June. My letters to the Secretary of State contain ſufficient reaſons why theſe operations could not take place ſooner.

Page 37.] *In theſe months (April and May) the rebel army was always reduced to its weakeſt ſtate.*

It was in the months of April and May that recruits for the rebel army were chiefly procured, who never could join it before the month of June.

They recruited, as all other armies do, in the winter; and their levies joined them early in ſpring. In ſummer their recruiting parties were in the field.

Page 38.] *He knew that dry forage was much more hearty food for his horſes than green; that he might have carried the ſame forage with him for a time, which ſuſtained him in their quarters; that the country was full of dry forage of every kind; and that he had ever obtained it when he ſtood in need of it, whether in the field or in his quarters (f).*

(f) Sir W. H—'s letter of the 17th of Jan. 1778. Lord Cornwallis procures "from the country, forage ſufficient for the winter conſumption.'

We had not forage in quarters, nor could we have carried any quantity for eſſential ſervice.

His reference to my letter of 17th of January, 1778, is of a piece with the reſt of his performance. The forage therein

ſpoken

ſpoken of was procured in the neighbourhood of Philadelphia, at the beginning of the winter. But though every means was exerted, we could not procure a ſufficient quantity of forage; and we ſhould have been much diſtreſſed in that article, if Lord Howe had not conveyed to us a conſiderable ſupply from Rhode-Iſland.

But what connection is there between the ſtate of forage at Philadelphia in the year 1778, and the opening of the campaign in Jerſey in 1777? The author is peculiarly expert in anachroniſm, and has, in ſome inſtances, not only tranſpoſed dates, but combined the circumſtances of different periods, for the ſake of ſtrengthening, or applying them to, a particular point of time.

Of the opening of the campaign 1777, I have already ſpoken. It is not neceſſary for me to ſay much of 1778.—Very early in April I received my orders to return home—The conduct, therefore, of the campaign of 1778 was to reſt upon my ſucceſſor. The army, however, was not *indolent or diſſipated* in that interval. —In the month of March I detached Colonel Mawhood to make a deſcent on the coaſt of Jerſey. He defeated the force collected againſt him, and brought off a large and ſeaſonable ſupply of forage.—Colonel Abercrombie was no leſs ſucceſsful in ſurpriſing, and entirely defeating, a corps of near a thouſand of the rebels, who had taken poſt about ſeventeen miles from Philadelphia. This ſervice was performed on the 4th of May; and on the 7th of May Major Maitland, with Capt. Henry of the navy, proceeded up the Delaware, to deſtroy the rebel ſhips and veſſels between Philadelphia and Trenton, an enterprize very ably conducted, and effectually executed.—Sir Henry Clinton arrived at Philadelphia on the 8th, and on the 24th of the ſame month I reſigned to him the command of the army.

Page 38.] *He ſaw repeated attempts made by bodies of men to form themſelves in arms, and to aſſiſt him in ſuppreſſing the Rebellion.*

The only attempt of this kind worth mentioning happened in North-Carolina, in the ſpring of 1776, when it was abſolutely impoſſible for me to give aſſiſtance to the inſurrection. The plan was concerted between a ſettlement of Highland emigrants, and

a body of Americans in that province, diſtinguiſhed by the name of Loyaliſts. They engaged to obey the orders of Governor Martin, who propoſed they ſhould operate in favour of the troops from Europe under Earl Cornwallis. The Loyaliſts promiſed 5000, the Highlanders 700, men. The former inſiſted upon their aſſembling immediately; the latter urged the expediency of waiting the arrival of the Britiſh troops, but yielded to the importunity of the Loyaliſts, and repaired in arms to the rendezvous, ſtronger than the ſtipulated complement. The Loyaliſts, inſtead of 5000, did not aſſemble a twentieth part of that number, and two companies of theſe deſerted, upon the near approach of the rebels. The Highlanders ſtood their ground, and fought bravely, but being overpowered, were defeated with conſiderable loſs, and forced to diſperſe.

Page, 38.] *He ſaw many of the inhabitants fined, impriſoned, and ſuffer death itſelf on account of their loyalty (g).*

(g) Sir William Howe's letters prove the truths I have endeavoured to ſupport.—In that dated the 8th of June, 1776, *he ſays, he landed his troops to the great joy of a moſt* faithful and loyal people.—*That he has great reaſon to expect a* numerous body *of the inhabitants to join the army from the provinces of New-York, the Jerſeys, and Connecticut; who, in this time of univerſal oppreſſion, only wait for opportunities to give proofs of their* loyalty and zeal for government.

The letter, which the author here quotes as dated the 8th of June, is dated the 7th of July, 1776, from Staten-Iſland. The few inhabitants of this place had been averſe from the violent meaſures adopted by their neighbours, and in conſequence ill-treated by the people of Jerſey. The arrival of the King's troops relieved them from future apprehenſions; and they teſtified their loyalty by all the means in their power. They furniſhed us with freſh proviſions, carriages, horſes, &c: at that time, therefore, they merited the deſcription I gave them in my letter. But it ſhould be remembered, that it was only the people of Staten-Iſland I ſpoke of. The campaign not having begun, I could have no perſonal knowledge of the loyalty of the people of New-York, the Jerſeys, or Connecticut. At Sandy-Hook I had met Governor Tryon, and ſome other gentlemen, who had taken refuge on board ſhip, and from them only could I receive infor-

mation of the diſpoſition of the people of thoſe provinces.—The event proved, that they were too ſanguine in their expectations.

Page 39.] *As another proof of my opinion of the great loyalty of the Americans, he adds in a note the following quotation from my letter to the Secretary of State, dated 20th Dec.* 1776.

'*The chain of cantonments is rather too extenſive, but I was induced to occupy Burlington, to cover the county of Monmouth,* in 'which there are many loyal inhabitants.'

This letter was written before the affair of Trenton, and I could have no reaſon to ſuſpect the fidelity of thoſe who came in to us from Monmouth; but I was ſoon undeceived. Many, very many, of theſe Loyaliſts, were a ſhort time afterwards taken in arms againſt us, and others killed with my protections in their pockets. In the pockets of the killed, and priſoners, were alſo found certificates of thoſe very men having ſubſcribed a declaration of allegiance, in conſequence of the Proclamation of the King's Commiſſioners for a general indemnity.—Theſe are notorious facts. N. B.

Page 39.] *And yet, contrary to theſe proofs, he, with many of his General officers, affected to believe them, and have ſince declared, that the people of that country were almoſt unanimouſly diſaffected to the Crown. Under this pretence we have ſeen him decline to intruſt the faithful and loyal ſubjects with arms, or to make uſe of the well-affected force in the colonies, to aſſiſt him in reducing, or in defending, after reduced, either cities or provinces.*

Various offers of raiſing men were made to me, nor did I decline any of thoſe offers that brought with them the leaſt proſpect of ſucceſs; but I muſt add, that very few of them were fulfilled in the extent propoſed.

Mr. Oliver Delancey, who was reputed to be the moſt likely man in New-York, to induce the Loyaliſts of that province

to join the King's troops, was appointed a Brigadier-General, and authoriſed to raiſe three Battalions, to conſiſt of 1500 privates, placing at the head of each the moſt reſpectable characters, recommended as ſuch by himſelf, and by Governor Tryon. Every poſſible effort was uſed by thoſe gentlemen, not only in the diſtricts poſſeſſed by the King's troops, but by employing perſons to go through the country, and invite the well-affected to come in. Several of the officers (as I have ſince been informed) anxious to complete their corps, ſought for recruits, even amongſt the priſoners, who were then very numerous, and ventured to hold out to them the temptations of pay, liberty, and pardon. Notwithſtanding all theſe efforts and encouragements; notwithſtanding the *loyalty* of the people, and the *many thouſands flying over to the Britiſh troops for protection* (as aſſerted by the author) Brigadier-General Delancey, at the opening of the campaign 1777, inſtead of 1,500, had only raiſed 597.

Mr. Courtland Skinner, who was acknowledged to poſſeſs conſiderable influence in the Jerſeys, where he had ſerved the office of Attorney-General with great integrity and reputation, was alſo appointed a Brigadier-General, and authoriſed to raiſe five Battalions, to conſiſt of 2,500 privates, under the command of gentlemen of the country, nominated by himſelf. The ſame efforts were made as for the raiſing of Delancey's corps; but, at the opening of the campaign 1777, Brigadier General Skinner's numbers amounted only to 517, towards his expected five Battalions of 2,500.

In November, 1777, Brigadier-General Delancey's corps encreaſed to 693, and Brigadier-General Skinner's to 859.—In May, 1778 their progreſs was ſo ſlow, that the firſt had only advanced to 707, the latter to 1101.

Several other corps were offered to be raiſed, and were accepted, in the winter of 1776, making in the whole thirteen, to conſiſt of 6,500 men, including the Brigades of Delancey and Skinner. But in May, 1778, the whole number in all theſe thirteen corps amounted only to 3,609, little more than half the promiſed complement, and of

theſe (as I have before obſerved) only a ſmall proportion were Americans.

Upon our taking poſſeſſion of Philadelphia, the ſame, and indeed greater encouragements were held out to the people of Pennſylvania.—*Mr. William Allen*, a gentleman who was ſuppoſed to have great family influence in that province—*Mr. Chalmers*, much reſpected in the three Lower Counties on Delaware, and in Maryland—and *Mr. Clifton*, the chief of the Roman Catholic perſuaſion, of whom there were ſaid to be many in Philadelphia, as well as in the rebel army, ſerving againſt their inclinations: Theſe gentlemen were appointed Commandants of corps, to receive, and form for ſervice, all the well-affected that could be obtained—And what was the ſucceſs of theſe efforts? In May, 1778, when I left America, Colonel Allen had raiſed only 152 rank and file—Colonel Chalmers 336—and Colonel Clifton 180; which, together with three Troops of light dragoons, conſiſting of 132 troopers, and 174 *real volunteers* from Jerſey, under Colonel Vandyke, amounting in the whole to 974 men, conſtituted all the force that could be collected in Pennſylvania, after the moſt indefatigable exertions, during eight months.

Page 39.] *When he paſſed through New Jerſey, and drove the panic ſtruck rebels out of that country, no ſtep was taken to embody and arm the friends of government, who were ready and anxious to be employed, in diſarming the diſaffected, in reſtoring the province to his Majeſty's peace, and in defending it when the army ſhould proceed in its other neceſſary operations.*

I never heard before of the *readineſs* and *anxiety* here expreſſed—nor could I—for that part of New Jerſey through which Earl Cornwallis marched, from Fort Lee to Trenton, was almoſt deſtitute of male inhabitants, a few excepted, who remained to fire, from behind buſhes, upon the King's troops as they paſſed. The idea of employing a people of this deſcription, in *diſarming the diſaffected, in reſtoring the province to peace*, and in *defending it* when the army ſhould proceed in its other operations, is too glaringly abſurd to deſerve farther comment.

Page

Page 40.] *In Philadelphia, where a militia might have been formed ſufficient, with the aſſiſtance of* 1000 *regulars, and a few veſſels of war, to have defended it againſt any force that could have been brought againſt it, while the Britiſh army was operating againſt the main body of the rebel army, there was the ſame unpardonable omiſſion, although he remained in that city near nine months.*

What I have before ſaid, concerning the ſucceſs of our endeavours to raiſe troops at Philadelphia, might be deemed a ſufficient anſwer to this paragraph. But it may be more ſatifactory, to give the reader an exact return of the number of inhabitants remaining within the city of Philadelphia, the Northern Liberties, and Diſtricts of Southwark, in October, 1777, taken from an exact liſt made out in the ſeparate wards, under the direction of *Mr. Galloway*.

Males under 18 years of age	- -	4941
Ditto above 18, and under 60	- -	4482
	Total males	9423
Females of all ages	- - -	12,344
	Total	21,767

Whether a militia, formed from the above, could contribute to the defence of the city, is ſubmitted; and to make the concluſion as eaſy as poſſible, I ſhall ſtate a very ſtrong fact, to ſhew how far the inhabitants were *anxious* to promote the King's ſervice, *even without carrying arms.*

As ſoon as we were in poſſeſſion of Philadelphia, my intention was to fortify it in ſuch a manner, as that it might be tenable by a ſmall number of men, whilſt the main army ſhould keep the field, and act againſt General Waſhington. To effectuate this purpoſe, I ſent orders from German Town to the chief Engineer, to conſtruct redoubts, and to form the neceſſary lines of communication. That the work might be expedited, and the labour of the ſoldiers ſpared, I, at the ſame time, directed him to employ the inhabitants, and pay them 8d. *per diem*, beſides

beſides a ration of ſalt proviſion each, without which, I was convinced they could not have been perſuaded to have worked at all.

Mr. Galloway, whom I had previouſly talked with upon the ſubject, had aſſured me there would be no difficulty in finding 500 men for this buſineſs; and I preſume he exerted himſelf to fulfil the expectations he had given me. But with all the aſſiduity of that gentleman, and all the means made uſe of by the chief Engineer, the whole number that could be prevailed upon to handle the pick-axe and ſpade, for the conſtruction of the redoubts and abbatis, amounted, each day, upon an average, to no more than between ſeventy and eighty.

Page 41.] *Did he take one ſtep which tended to reconcile the people to his Majeſty's intereſts and government; or to bring them back to their former allegiance, although he had a commiſſion and inſtructions for that purpoſe?*

Every ſtep was taken for theſe purpoſes, and the meaſures purſued by my Brother and me, in the execution of our civil commiſſion, were approved by the King's Miniſter. Our inſtructions have not yet been made public, and therefore it would be improper to diſcuſs them in this place.

Page 41.] *Although he ſaw the people in different parts of the country, making every effort in their power to aſſiſt him; yet we find in all his proclamations, an injunction on them to remain peaceably in their habitations, without the leaſt invitation to take up arms in behalf of the Crown, or the ſmalleſt intimation, that their aſſiſtance would accord with his wiſhes. An injunction which amounted, in effect, to a prohibition, and rendered it dangerous, if not unlawful, for them to act otherwiſe, becauſe a ſtrict obedience to it was the only condition upon which he promiſed them his Majeſty's protection.*

I have already deſcribed the *efforts* and *aſſiſtance* of the people in different parts of the country.

Many

Many of my Proclamations contained invitations to arms, and promiſes of large encouragements. The author here perhaps meant to allude to one particular Declaration, which I iſſued when the army landed at the head of Elk. I ſhall ſubjoin a copy of that Declaration, which will prove how invidiouſly he has miſ-quoted it.

As to his ſuggeſtion, that the injunction, for the people to remain peaceably in their habitations, amounted to a prohibition againſt their taking up arms in behalf of the Crown, and rendered it *dangerous*, if not *unlawful* for them to do ſo, becauſe *a ſtrict obedience to the declaration was the only condition upon which I promiſed them his Majeſty's protection*; this, I think, is a quibble, which would never have entered the head of an *Engliſh* Lawyer.

As this Declaration was calculated for the meridian of Pennſylvania, of the people of which province *Mr. Galloway* profeſſed an intimate knowledge, I conſulted him previouſly upon it; I framed it agreeably to his ideas; when written, it had his full approbation.

Mr. Galloway aſſured me, that the inhabitants of that part of the country would come in to us. Soon after our landing, I complained to him of my diſappointment in that particular.—He returned for anſwer, that the people were not ſo well affected in that part of the country as they were farther on; and that I ſhould find them more and more loyal, as I advanced towards the Capital of Pennſylvania. This information, however, proved equally falſe. Through the whole march of the army, from the Head of Elk to Philadelphia, the male inhabitants, fit to bear arms (a very few excepted) had deſerted their dwellings, and, I had great reaſon to believe, were in arms againſt us. The Quakers were the only people againſt whom I entertained no ſuſpicion.

DECLARATION.

SIR WILLIAM HOWE, regretting the calamities, to which many of his Majeſty's faithful ſubjects are ſtill expoſed, by the continuance of the rebellion, and no leſs deſirous of protecting the innocent, than determined to purſue with the rigours of war all thoſe, whom his Majeſty's forces, in the courſe of their progreſs, may find in arms againſt the King, doth hereby aſſure the peaceable inhabitants of the Province of Pennſylvania, the Lower Counties on Delaware, and the Counties of Maryland on the eaſtern ſhore of Cheſapeak Bay, that, in order to remove any groundleſs apprehenſions, which may have been raiſed, of their ſuffering by depredations of the army under his command, he hath iſſued the ſtricteſt orders to the troops, for the preſervation of regularity and good diſcipline; and has ſignified, that the moſt exemplary puniſhment ſhall be inflicted upon thoſe, who ſhall dare to plunder the property, or moleſt the perſons, of any of his Majeſty's well-diſpoſed ſubjects.

Security and protection are likewiſe extended to all perſons, inhabitants of this Province, who, not guilty of having aſſumed legiſlative or judicial authority, may have acted illegally in ſubordinate ſtations, and, conſcious of their miſconduct, been induced to leave their dwellings, provided ſuch perſons do forthwith return, and remain peaceably at their uſual places of abode.

Conſidering moreover, that many officers and private men, now actually in arms againſt his Majeſty, may be willing to relinquiſh the part they have taken in this rebellion, and return to their due allegiance: Sir William Howe doth, therefore, promiſe a free and general pardon to all ſuch officers and private men, as ſhall voluntarily come, and ſurrender themſelves, to any detachment of his Majeſty's Forces, before the day on which it ſhall be notified, that the ſaid indulgence is to be diſcontinued.

Given under my Hand, at Head-Quarters of the Army,
the 27th Day of Auguſt, 1777.

W. HOWE.

Page 42.] *Thouſands came in wherever the army marched, and took the oath, but the Royal Faith; pledged for their ſafety, was ſhamefully violated. The unhappy people, inſtead of receiving the protection promiſed, were plundered by the ſoldiery. Their wives and daughters were violently polluted by the luſtful brutality of the loweſt of mankind; and friends and foes indiſcriminately met with the ſame barbarian treatment.*

If the Britiſh General was indolent and neglectful in putting a ſtop to theſe cruelties, the rebel commander and the new ſtates were not ſo in converting them to their own benefit. Every poſſible advantage was taken of theſe enormities (h). *Affidavits were taken of the plunder, and of every rape. They were publiſhed in all their newſpapers, to irritate and enrage the people againſt his Majeſty and the Britiſh nation. The Britiſh ſoldiers were repreſented as a race of men more inhuman than ſavages. By theſe means, the minds of many were turned againſt the Britiſh government, and many in deſperation joined the rebel army. The force of the rebels was increaſed, the Britiſh weakened, and the humanity and glory of Britons received a diſgraceful tarniſh, which time can never efface.*

This is a rhapſody calculated, *alternately to freeze and fire the blood of the indignant reader*, and my humanity, as well as my honour, is concerned in the refutation of its falſehood.

It may be remembered that, when this country began to grow impatient under the long continuance of the American war, (with a ſpeedy termination of which the people had been repeatedly flattered, notwithſtanding the contrary aſſurances the Secretary of State was poſſeſſed of from me) the moſt illiberal and unceaſing attempts were made, to divert the publick odium from the Miniſter to the General. One of the principal allegations againſt him, and againſt his Brother alſo, was, that they were too lenient, too diſcriminate towards the inhabitants of America. Severity, in its moſt ſavage extent, was held to be the only means of quelling the rebellion. The ſufferings, even of the innocent, were to operate in our favour, by rendering them weary of the conteſt, and by exciting the multitude to ſubmiſſion. Such was the language of thoſe times. But Major General

General Grey, in his evidence before the Houſe of Commons, depoſed, " that he never ſaw any degree of lenity ſhewn to the " Americans, but what was highly proper, and much to the " honour of the General and the Britiſh army."--The imputation of improper lenity having thus loſt its weight, the charge is ſuddenly reverſed.—*Major General Robertſon* and *Mr. Galloway* are brought to ſay, that the inhabitants were plundered by the King's army, and (the enquiry in the Houſe of Commons being haſtily cloſed, ſo as to exclude the farther examination of witneſſes on my part, who could have counterbalanced the weight of theſe and other allegations) the author of letters to a nobleman is inſtigated to alledge, that no lenity at all was ſhewn towards the people of America; but that, on the contrary, every ſpecies of cruelty, at which the human mind revolts, was countenanced and encouraged.

General Robertſon ſays, that the troops, as they paſſed through the Jerſeys, plundered the inhabitants; but he alſo confeſſes, that *the commander in chief gave orders againſt it repeatedly*; and he might have added, that Earl Cornwallis, who commanded the army when they paſſed through the Jerſeys, exerted himſelf to prevent that, and every other irregularity. Even *Mr. Galloway*, who in his evidence aſſerts that plunder was committed, acknowledges at the ſame time, that upon a memorial being preſented, relative to the plunder of a large quantity of Madeira wine, (which was one of the moſt flagrant inſtances) the matter was duly enquired into, and ſettled.

The author of letters to a nobleman well knows, that my general Orders, and my Proclamations, againſt plundering, were inceſſant; and in my conſcience I believe, there never was leſs plundering, nor fewer enormities committed by any army, in the field, and where the inhabitants were in arms againſt the troops, than by that army which I had the honour to command. With regard to *the pollution of wives and daughters by the luſtful brutality of the loweſt of mankind*, I declare, that I do not recollect to have ever heard of more than one rape imputed to the ſoldiery, and that was ſaid to have been committed in Cheſter county, in the province of New-York. The criminal was

ſecured; an enquiry immediately took place; but the accuſer refuſed to proſecute.

It may be true (as the author aſſerts) that the Leaders of the rebellion circulated accounts of Britiſh barbarity in their newſpapers.—To irritate the inhabitants againſt the King's authority and government was an invariable part of their ſyſtem. The newſpapers of America, like thoſe of other countries, are the vehicles of invention and calumny, in ſupport of party. But if ſuch accounts had been founded in truth, complaints from the perſons, or families injured, would probably have reached me; as they did not, I am perſuaded the accounts were falſe.

That irregularities will ſometimes be committed by a numerous army, cannot be denied. All I contend for is, that, circumſtances conſidered, they were few, and not of an enormous nature; that every means was uſed to prevent them; and the delinquents, when convicted, always puniſhed in proportion to the offence.

Page 43.] *The ſuffering of the ſoldiers to plunder, and commit other outrages, was a dangerous relaxation of diſcipline. It rendered them avaritious, neglectful of their duty, and diſobedient to command.*

That the King's troops in America were relaxed in diſcipline, negligent of their duty, and ſyſtematically diſobedient to command, are allegations perfectly new, and, I will add, ſcandalouſly falſe, reflecting, without ſhadow of proof, upon the honour and conduct of all the officers who ſerved with me in that army.

Page 45.] *If near* 20,000 *men, aſſiſted by the Britiſh fleet, were neceſſary to carry on the operations in Pennſylvania, a country which he acknowledges to be in general well affected to government, he muſt certainly know, that one third of that number were not ſufficient to oppoſe the united force of the five moſt diſaffected of all the revolted colonies.*

He miſrepreſents the numbers of the ſouthern army. They amounted to 13,799 rank and file, including the Britiſh, foreign, and provincial force. I have acknowledged, that *I was informed* the

rhe country of Pennſylvania was in general well affected. I teceived ſuch information principally from *Mr. Galloway*, who was a ſtrong advocate for the expedition into that province.

Page 45.] *He could not have taken a more effectual ſtep to ſacrifice the northern army, than that of carrying his whole force to the ſouthward, without leaving a corps ſufficient to make a diverſion in its favour.*

This is a very groſs miſrepreſentation. So far from carrying my *whole force* to the ſouthward, I left at New-York about 8,500 rank and file, fit for duty. I do not include the ſick and convaleſcents of thoſe corps, nor of the ſouthern army, which together amounted to more than 3,000 men. With that force Sir Henry Clinton did make a diverſion in favour of the northern army. But I ſhall ever inſiſt, and I am ſupported by evidence in inſiſting, that the ſouthern expedition, by drawing off General Waſhington and his whole force, was the ſtrongeſt diverſion that could have been made. This ſubject is fully diſcuſſed in my Narrative to the Houſe of Commons, (page 20) and Major General Grey's evidence is as follows:

Q. "Did not the expedition to Philadelphia prove a powerful "diverſion in favour of the northern army?"

A. "I think a ſtronger, or more ſolid diverſion could not "have been made, than that of drawing General Waſhing-"ton, and the whole continental army, near three hundred "miles off."

Q. "Whether the moſt probable motive, to have obliged "General Waſhington to come to a general engagement, was "not the preſervation of Philadelphia; I mean, was there any "other probable object that would have drawn General "Waſhington to an engagement?

A. "I do not think there was any one object, which would "have tempted General Waſhington to riſk a general action, ſo "much as the fear of loſing the Capital of Pennſylvania."

Q. "Was

Q. " Was there any probability of bringing the war in " America to a termination that campaign, without forcing " General Waſhington to a general engagement?"

A. " Certainly not."

Q. " Whether, if Mr. Waſhington had his choice, with " reſpect to the direction of Sir William Howe's army, he would " have wiſhed him to have gone up the Hudſon's river, or to " Philadelphia?"

A. " With the force that Sir William Howe had under his " command I think, if General Waſhington had a wiſh, it was " for him to have gone up the North river."

Page 46.] *Why was ſo high-ſpirited an army taken from the ſight of an enemy of not half its force, put on board a fleet, and expoſed to all the accidents and dangers of the ocean,* &c.

My reaſons for going by ſea are fully ſet forth in my Narrative (page 16).

Page 46.] *And why, when Philadelphia was his object, after he had experienced the oppoſition of the trade wind, did he obſtinately perſiſt in his circuitous route,* &c.

My reaſons for going the circuitous route by Cheſapeak-Bay are alſo given in my Narrative, and they are fully confirmed and juſtified by the depoſition of Sir Andrew Snape Hammond to the Houſe of Commons, which I have given in a ſubſequent remark.

Page 47.] *In the midſt of victory the ardor of his troops was ſuppreſſed.*

I ſuppoſe the author here alludes to my conduct near the Lines of Brooklyn, on the 27th of Auguſt, 1776. As this was much ſcrutinized in the Houſe of Commons, I ſhall fairly inſert the evidence upon the ſubject.

Examination

Examination of EARL CORNWALLIS.

Q. " Did your Lordſhip ſee the enemy's Lines at Brooklyn, " during the action of the 27th of Auguſt, 1776?"

A. " I did not ſee them on that day with any accuracy; I " was on the left with the ſecond Battalion of grenadiers, and " could form no judgement."

Q. " From the knowledge you had of thoſe Lines after the " action, would it have been a prudent meaſure to have aſſaulted " thoſe works, on that day?"

A. " I apprehend the latter part of that queſtion is matter " of opinion; I never did hear it ſuggeſted by any one, that " thoſe Lines could have been carried by aſſault."

Third Day's Examination of MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON.

Q. " From the circumſtances of the purſuit of the 27th of " Auguſt, and the manner in which the rebels retreated, do you " apprehend the Lines of Brooklyn might have been ſtormed?"

A. " There was a ridge of heights ſeperated us from the " rebels; the rebels had poſſeſſion of them, and it would have " been very difficult to have forced them; General Howe, by " making a march in the night, got the better of the difficulty; " we got near the rebel camp without their perceiving us. " General Howe put himſelf at the head of the troops, and " puſhed in between the heights and the rebel Lines; by this " move we got 2000 priſoners. Some of the troops were going " to ſtorm the Lines; General Howe thought proper to order " them back."

Q. " Do you apprehend, in the manner in which the rebels " fled to the Lines, and in which that part of our army purſued " them, that, if our troops had not been called back, they " would have ſtormed the Lines, and carried them?"

A. " I did not myſelf know the ſtrength of the Lines, nor do " I believe General Howe did at that time. I have heard ſince, " that the Lines were weakly manned; and that Putnam, who

" had the command there of 7000 men, had detached all to the " heights but 300; but this was a circumſtance known to " nobody at the time, it was a circumſtance General Howe " could not poſſibly know, and I did not myſelf, at the time, " think, that, ſtorming them would have been a proper meaſure."

Q. " Do you know whether Sir William Howe took imme- " diate care to follow the enemy, as ſoon as he was informed " of their evacuating the Lines?"

A. " Sir William Howe was always alert. I ſent my Aid- " de-camp to head-quarters, to give notice that my Brigade was " ready to march; when he returned, Sir William Howe was " gone out, I apprehended, to head ſome part of the army."

Q. " On what do you found your opinion, that Sir William " Howe could not be a judge of the force of the enemy's lines " on the 27th of Auguſt?"

A. " I marched at the head of my Brigade to a place near " the enemy's Lines; I went to the ſituation where I thought I " could ſee them beſt from, without leaving my Brigade far; and " I could not make any judgement of the ſtrength of the enemy's " Lines, from any place I could ſee them: This made me wiſh " that the grenadiers would not go on, and pleaſed to think " that my ideas correſponded with Sir William Howe's; I " imagined that the General called back the troops, becauſe he " was unable to form a juſt eſtimate of the force of the Lines."

Page 48.] *At Brunſwic, in December, 1776, Lord Cornwallis was upon the heels of the enemy.—The deſtruction of a bridge over the Rariton ſaved them—only for a few hours.—Their further ſecurity was owing to the orders received by that nobleman to halt at Brunſwick.*

The Rariton is fordable in that place, at every receſs of the tide;—and had the noble General been free to act at his own diſcretion, he might, and no doubt would, have purſued his enfeebled and panic-ſtruck enemy to the Delaware, over which they never could have paſſed, without falling into his hands,

In anſwer to theſe aſſertions, I believe, it will be ſufficient to oppoſe the evidence of Earl Cornwallis.

Q. "Would it have been prudent, to have purſued the "enemy from Brunſwic, with the part of your Lordſhip's corps, "which firſt reached that place?"

A. "As my conduct in America forms no part of the pre- "ſent enquiry, I certainly do not think myſelf, at preſent, ac- "countable to this Houſe for any action of my own. I am "however, on the preſent occaſion, free to ſay, that I could not "have purſued the enemy from Brunſwic, with any proſpect of "material advantage, or, without greatly diſtreſſing the troops "under my command."

Q. "In what reſpect, would the purſuit of the enemy from "Brunſwic, have diſtreſſed the troops under your command?"

A. "We arrived at Brunſwic the night of the 1ſt of De- "cember. We had marched that day twenty miles, through "exceeding bad roads. We ſubſiſted only on the flour we found "in the country; and as the troops had been conſtantly march- "ing, ever ſince their firſt entry into the Jerſeys, they had no "time to bake their flour; the artillery horſes, and baggage horſes "of the army were quite tired; that ſufficiently proves, that we were "not in a good condition to undertake a long march. The bridge "over the Rariton was broken, which cauſed a neceſſary delay "of one day. If the enemy could not have paſſed at Trenton, "they might have marched down the eaſt ſide of the Delaware. "What I have ſaid, I believe, is ſufficient to prove, that we "could not reap any conſiderable advantage from ſuch a purſuit."

Q. "Were the troops, under the command of your Lordſhip, "in a condition to have marched before the 6th?"

A. "The troops would have been ſo undoubtedly."

Q. "What was the impediment to purſuing the march from "Brunſwic, as your Lordſhip ſays the troops were undoubtedly "able, before the 6th?"

A. "As the enemy had ſo much the ſtart of us, I do not ſee "there was any great object for the march. We wanted re-in-

" forcement, in order to leave troops for the communication " between Brunſwic and Amboy. It was likewiſe neceſſary, to " pay ſome attention to a conſiderable body of troops, then " paſſing the north river, under General Lee."

Q. " Did you ſtop at Brunſwic, from the 1ſt to the 6th, in " conſequence of orders?"

A. " I underſtood it to be the General's directions, that I " ſhould halt at Brunſwic; but had I ſeen, that I could have " ſtruck a material ſtroke, by moving forward, I certainly ſhould " have taken it upon me to have done it."

Page 48.] *At Brunſwic the Britiſh army halted near a week: Waſhington's, conſiſting of* 3000 *men, lay at Prince-Town, ſeventeen miles—and at Trenton on the Delaware, twenty-nine miles diſtant, with all his heavy cannon and baggage.*

The reaſons for halting at Brunſwic are ſtated above by Earl Cornwallis.

Waſhington's force, at this time, conſiſted of 6000 men, excluſive of Lee's corps of 4000. General Waſhington loſt no time, in croſſing his artillery and baggage over the Delaware at Trenton, before we could move from Brunſwic. He alſo croſſed part of his troops, keeping a corps on the eaſt ſide to obſerve our motions.

Page 49.] *On the 7th of December, the army marched from Brunſwic at four o'clock in the morning, and arrived at Prince-Town in the afternoon about the ſame hour.*

The troops of the left column were not in their cantonments, in the evening of the march to Prince-Town, until after dark, and thoſe of the right column, not until ſome hours after dark. Earl Cornwallis (that his march might be impeded as little as poſſible) left his tents behind him.

Page 49.] *He waited at Prince-Town ſeventeen hours, marched at nine o'clock on the morning of the eighth, and arrived at Trenton at four o'clock in the afternoon.*

The

The cauſe of not marching earlier the following day was, that the enemy had broken down a bridge, which could not be ſooner repaired, and rendered fit for the paſſage of artillery, &c.

Page 50.] *Every one expected, that he would paſs that river (the Delaware) as it is ſo eaſily practicable, and as it muſt have been followed by the greateſt advantages.*

To this alſo I ſhall oppoſe the evidence of Earl Cornwallis, viz.

Q. "Was there any movement made in the purſuit of the "enemy to Trenton, with a deſign to croſs the Delaware at that "time?"

A. "The night that the General arrived at Trenton, he de-"tached me, with a conſiderable corps of troops, from Maiden-"head to Coriel's-Ferry, where we had ſome hopes, from "previous meaſures taken by the General, that we ſhould have "found boats to croſs the river. Our expectations were diſap-"pointed, and we found no boats."

Q. "Whether the execution of that meaſure (croſſing the "Delaware) was practicable at that time?"

A. "As the Delaware was not fordable, and we could get "no boats, it was certainly impracticable, as I have ſaid."

Page 51.] *The General having reſolved not to croſs the Delaware, began to form his winter cantonments. In this inſtance, he diſcovered no more military judgment than he had ſhewn vigor in purſuing his enemy. He ſcattered and extended them from Burlington to New-York, a ſpace of almoſt ninety miles; dividing his force into ſmall diſtant parties, liable to be cut off by the enemy, one after another, with eaſe. But this was not the moſt cenſurable part of his conduct: the frontier poſts, or thoſe neareſt to the enemy, were committed to the command of foreigners, who could not underſtand the language of the country.*

I have ſpoken fully upon this ſubject in my Narrative; but, as a farther juſtification, I ſhall here add the teſtimony of Earl Cornwallis, viz.

 Q. "For

Q. " For the reaſons then known to your Lordſhip, was " Sir William Howe juſtifiable, in having taken Trenton into " the chain of cantonments, and for poſting the Heſſian troops, " with the 42d regiment, there, and at Bordentown, under the " command of Colonel Donop?

A. " This again is a queſtion of opinion, and does come " under the deſcription of thoſe, which I think myſelf not " bound to anſwer: but, as I believe I was the perſon, who firſt " ſuggeſted the idea to the General, of taking Trenton and Bor- " dentown into the chain of his cantonments, I think myſelf in " honour bound to anſwer it.

" The advantage that muſt naturally ariſe, from holding ſo " large a part of the Jerſeys; the great encouragement we met " with from the inhabitants, three or four hundred of whom " came in, and took the oath every day, for at leaſt ten days; " the great advantage we ſhould derive, from obtaining forage " and proviſions, made me think it adviſable to riſk that extended " cantonment. Human prudence could not foreſee the fatal " event of the ſurrender of Colonel Rhall's brigade. I appre- " hended no danger, but the chance of having our quarters beat " up in the winter; and the object, in my opinion, towards " finiſhing the war, was of greater conſequence, than two or " three victories. In regard to what the General mentions, of " poſting the Heſſians on the left of the cantonments, I muſt " ſay, I ever had, and ſtill have, the higheſt opinion of thoſe " brave troops. The misfortune at Trenton was owing entirely " to the imprudence and negligence of the Commanding Officer. " On all other occaſions, the troops ever have behaved, and, I " dare ſay, ever will behave, with the greateſt courage and intre- " pidity. The behaviour, on the attack of Fort Waſhington, " of this very brigade of Colonel Rhall's, was the admiration of " the whole army."

To this I will add the teſtimony of Sir George Oſborne, who being aſked, " if he ever heard Colonel Donop expreſs his ſenti- " ments, relative to the poſt at Trenton, either before or after " his defeat?" anſwered,

" In the ſituation I had the honour to be with the Heſſian " troops, I lived in a degree of friendſhip with Colonel Donop, " and very frequently, after the misfortune at Trenton, he ac- " quainted me, that if Colonel Rhall had executed the orders he " had delivered to him from Sir William Howe, which were to " erect redoubts at the poſt of Trenton, that his opinion was, it " would have been impoſſible to have forced Colonel Rhall's " brigade, before he could have come to his aſſiſtance from " Bordenton."

Page 59.] *Which (viz. Waſhington's whole force) being at this time leſs than* 4,000.

Waſhington, after Lee's corps joined him, had never leſs than about 8,000 men.

Page 61.] *He did not open the campaign till the* 12*th of June.*

I have ſpoken to this point above.

Page 61.] *On that day (*12*th of June) the Britiſh General aſſembled his troops at Brunſwic. Waſhington was encamped on a hill above Quibble-Town, about nine miles from that place, on the north ſide of the Rariton, with fewer than* 6000 *undiſciplined and badly appointed troops; which, with a corps under Sullivan of* 2000 *men at Prince-Town, compoſed his whole force.*

From intelligence I then had, and which I have not ſince had any reaſon to doubt, Waſhington had not leſs than 10,000 in his camp, on the hill above Quibble-Town.

Page 61.] *His camp (at Quibble-Town) was far from being inacceſſible or fortified. It was ſtrong and defenſible in front, becauſe it was guarded by the Rariton, and the hill was ſteep and difficult of acceſs: but in his rear, towards the mountains, or on his right, towards the Delaware, it was by no means impracticable of aſſault.*

His

 no reason aſſigned.

His camp was to the full as inacceſſible in the rear, as in the front; and an attack upon his right flank (from every account I could get) would have been ſtill more hazardous.

Page 62.] *Theſe circumſtances plainly informed Waſhington, that Sir William Howe did not mean to croſs the Delaware, and that he was not anxious to bring on an action.*

General Waſhington was certainly induced to believe, that my intention was to attack him; and had he not been perfectly ſatisfied with the ſtrength of his poſt, he would not have remained ſo long in it.

Page 63.] *Sir William Howe, with* 17,000 *men, was in the field, in ſight of his contemptible enemy.*

I marched from Brunſwic with about 11,000 fighting men. It being neceſſary to leave the poſts of Amboy and Brunſwic in a proper ſtate of defence, between 3 and 4,000 men were left for that purpoſe. This circumſtance is more particularly explained in my Narrative (page 15).

Page 66.] *The note* (c).

This note is a criticiſm on the variation of my plans. My plans undoubtedly did vary, according to circumſtances. The variation of circumſtances, and the variation of my plans, are ſtated in my Narrative ſo fully, as to require no farther diſcuſſion.

Page 68 and 69.]

The author here adopts the common place arguments againſt the expedition up the Cheſapeak. If what I have ſaid in my Narrative upon that ſubject is not ſatisfactory, the evidence of Sir Andrew Snape Hammond, is ſo full, ſo clear, and ſo uncontrovertible, that I ſhould imagine the expediency of that route can no longer admit of a doubt, in the mind of any impartial man.

Martis

Martis 11, *die Maii*, 1779.

COMMITTEE to conſider of the ſeveral papers, which were preſented to the Houſe, by Mr. De Grey, upon the 19th day of March laſt, purſuant to their Addreſs to his Majeſty.

Mr. FREDERICK MONTAGUE IN THE CHAIR.

Sir *Andrew Snape Hammond* called in, and examined by Sir William and Lord Howe.

Q. " Did you ſerve in the ſquadron, under the command " of Lord Howe, in North-America, in 1777?"

A. " I did; I commanded a detached ſquadron on the coaſt " of Delaware and Virginia, for a year and an half, except at " ſome intervals prior to that period."

Q. " Had you been employed in the command of a detach- " ment of frigates, to watch the motion of the rebels on the " Delaware, for ſeveral months antecedent to the arrival of the " Britiſh fleet, off of the entrance of that river, on the 30th of " July 1777?"

A. " I was employed on that ſervice for ſeveral months before."

Q. " Of what number of ſhips and veſſels do you reckon " that fleet conſiſted; I mean the Britiſh fleet which arrived off " the Delaware?"

A. " Of two hundred and fifty ſail."

Q. " Was the navigation of the Delaware very intricate and " hazardous, eſpecially from the ſhoals and rapidity of the tides?"

A. " It certainly is; I do not know any river ſo difficult " of navigation."

Q. " Was it more particularly ſo, for the expeditious paſ- " ſage of large ſhips of war?"

A. " Large ſhips of war can only paſs certain places at par- " ticular times of tides."

Q. " What was your report to Lord Howe, on the 30th of July, " of the poſition of the enemy on the banks of the Delaware?"

A. " The

A. " The report which I recollect I made to Lord Howe on " that day was, That I had received intelligence the day before, " that General Washington had crossed the Delaware, and was " marching down to Wilmington from Philadelphia."

Q. " What did you understand to be the nature of the Penn- " sylvania shore, with respect to an easy communication with the " interior parts of the country, up to Reedy Island?

A. " The coast of the Delaware, from Cape Hinlopen all the " way up to Reedy Island, is marshy low land, very full of creeks, " and communicates to the Upland only by causeways."

Q. " What was the nature of the shore, on the same side, " from Reedy Island to Newcastle?

A. " In some places marshy, in others some tolerable landing " places."

Q. " What extent of anchorage do you suppose the fleet would " occupy, in any part of the navigable channel of the Delaware, " from Reedy Island up to Chester?"

A. " The main channel of the river is so narrow till you pass " Wilmington, or rather till you pass Newcastle, that I conclude " it would require at least four miles, if not more.

Q. " At what distance must the ships and vessels lie from the " shore in such anchorage?"

A. " Within gun shot on both sides—within cannon shot in " all places, and within musquet shot in some.

Q. " How many miles an hour do the tides run in the Dela- " ware?"

A. " Between three and four."

Q. " What did you understand to be the water-guard, which " the rebels had provided, to obstruct the free navigation of the " river; I mean the whole force on the river?"

A. " There were two frigates at Philadelphia, not complete as " to men—at Mud-Island, where the fort was, there was a ship " called the Province ship, which mounted eigh teen 18 pounder

" —the

" —the Delaware frigate of twenty-eight 12 pounders—two " xebecks, mounting each two 24 pounders in their bow, two " 18 pounders in their ſtern, and four 9 pounders each in their " waiſt—a brig mounting ſixteen 6 pounders—two floating bat- " teries, the one of twelve 18 pounders, the other of 10; theſe " guns were moveable on either ſide—thirteen row gallies, each " carrying one gun, from 32 pounds to 18—thirty-ſix row boats, " or half gallies, carrying a 6 pounder, or a 4 pounder—I believe " that was all, except fire rafts, of which there were twenty- " five, or thirty—each compoſed of five ſtages chained together."

Q. " Did it appear afterwards, that your report of that wa- " ter guard was well founded?"

A. " It did; I ſaw them all myſelf."

Q. " Whether the proper boats of the ſhips of war were of " a conſtruction and force, well adapted to oppoſe their water " guard on night ſervice?"

A. " Certainly not."

Q. " Whether the ſmall armed veſſels of the fleet were ade- " quate to that purpoſe, the Cornwallis galley excepted?"

A. " By no means."

[*Examined by the other Members of the Committee.*]

Q. " What is the nature of the ſhore above Reedy Iſland, " and below Wilmington, with reſpect to the flatneſs of the " country, and the eaſe of covering a landing by the ſhips?"

A. " I have before ſaid, that the ſhore between Reedy Iſland " and Newcaſtle is marſhy in ſome places, and that there are " landing places in parts of it—Above Newcaſtle, as far as Wil- " mington Creek, it is an entire marſh."

Q. " Could the army have landed either at Newcaſtle; or " upon any parts of the weſtern ſhore of the Delaware, between " Newcaſtle and Reedy Iſland?"

A. " An

A. " An army can land any where, where there is no oppo-
" ſition."

Q. " Do you believe that the ſituation of the rebels was
" ſuch, that they could have made ſuch an oppoſition as to pre-
" vent our troops landing, aſſiſted, as the troops could have
" been, by the fleet, at the time of your report?"

A. " That is a queſtion impoſſible for me to anſwer, unleſs
" I knew the force that was likely to oppoſe them."

Q. " What do you believe that force to have been?"

A. " The intelligence I received was, that General Waſhing-
" ton was in that country with his whole army."

Q. " In what part of the country?"

A. " My intelligence mentioned Wilmington."

Q. " Whether in the ſituation of Wilmington, with reſpect
" to Newcaſtle, troops, poſted at Wilmington, could have been
" uſed to prevent a landing at Newcaſtle, or below Newcaſtle?"

A. " I conceive the rebel army would have marched to the
" ſpot where the Britiſh troops meant to land; I do not ſuppoſe
" the rebel army were meant to remain poſted at Wilmington."

Q. " Whether you believe the rebel troops could have kept
" poſſeſſion of Newcaſtle, if they had marched there?"

A. " That queſtion can only be anſwered by a land officer."

Q. " Do you now believe that the rebel troops were at, or
" near, Wilmington?"

A. " By the works I ſaw at Wilmington, I have reaſon to
" think, that the rebel army were there at that time—the 30th
" of July."

Q. " Do you know that a great weſtern road leads from
" Newcaſtle to the Head of the Elk?"

A. " I have heard ſo."

Q. " Do

Q. " Do you ſee any reaſon to have prevented the rebel " troops from marching to the Head of the Elk, in the ſame " manner as you ſuppoſe they might have marched to Newcaſtle, " from Wilmington?"

A. " I have very little knowledge of the marching of armies."

Q. " How far is it from Newcaſtle to the Head of the Elk?"

A. " It is called by the map ſeventeen miles."

Q. " How far is it by ſea from Cape Hinlopen to the Head " of the Elk?"

A. " About 350 miles."

Q. " Are there not many difficulties in the navigation to " the Head of the Elk?"

A. " There are ſome difficulties, but the navigation of the " Cheſapeak is exceedingly eaſy in general."

Q. " What is the diſtance between Reedy-Iſland and " Newcaſtle?"

A. " Five or ſix miles."

Q. " Might not the fleet have lain below Reedy-Iſland in " ſafety, within a ſmall diſtance of Reedy-Iſland?"

A. " There is no part of the Delaware, between the ſhoals, " where they could have lain, without being expoſed to the " fire rafts?"

Q. " Whether the fleet, on returning to the Delaware, were " not neceſſarily expoſed to the fire rafts?"

A. " When the fleet returned from the Cheſapeak, they came " in detachments, and we were in poſſeſſion of the lower " Chevaux de Frize of the enemy."

Q. " How far was the lower Chevaux de Frize from Reedy- " Iſland?"

A. " About eighteen or twenty miles."

Q. " Might not the fleet have gone up in detachments on " the 30th of July, and the beginning of Auguſt?"

 A. " That

A. " That depends on the mode the Commanding Officer " chuſes to conduct them in."

Q. " When you made the report on board the Eagle, on the " 30th of July, whether you mentioned the intelligence reſpect- " ing Wilmington, as a reaſon, to induce the Commander in " Chief to proceed up the Delaware?"

A. " I had no other inducement than to do my duty, and to " relate particularly to the Commanding Officer every intelli- " gence I had received."

Q. " Was there any other intelligence given at the ſame " time?"

A. " I do not recollect any."

Q. " What do you conceive to be the reaſon, that the Com- " mander in Chief went to Cheſapeak, inſtead of the Delaware?"

A. " As no publick reaſons were given to me, I hope the " Houſe will not think me wanting in reſpect to them, if I de- " cline ſaying what the ſubſtance of the private communication " was."

Q. " What is the width of the river oppoſite to Newcaſtle?"

A. " The width of the river, immediately oppoſite Newcaſtle, " is about three miles."

Q. " What is the breadth of the navigable channel in that " place?"

A. " About two miles there, and below conſiderably " narrower."

Q. " What width in the narroweſt parts below, between " the Pickpat ſhoals and Fort Penn?"

A. " Not above half a mile from one ſhoal to another in the " narroweſt part."

Q. " How many days, from the 30th of July, does he " ſuppoſe it would have taken the fleet, to have come to anchor " off of Reedy-Iſland, in a diſpoſition fit for landing the troops?"

A. " As

A. " As it would depend entirely on the wind, it is impoſſible " to anſwer that directly, but I ſhould ſuppoſe, not leſs than " four or five days."

Q. " Suppoſe the wind fair?"

A. " With a fair wind, in three or four days."

Q. " With the whole fleet, ſhips of war and tranſports?"

A. " I have before ſaid, the ſhips of war can paſs particular " ſhoals only, at particular times of the tide."

Q. " Do you apprehend, that the enemy's water force would " have been the greateſt impediment to our landing troops above " Reedy-Iſland?"

A. " Yes, I do; the row gallies, in particular, are con- " ſtructed to go in very ſhoal water—they would lay on the flats " of the river, where the ſhips guns could not be brought to " bear on them."

Q. " Whether the ſhips guns could not be brought to bear " on the bite of Newcaſtle?"

A. " Certainly they could."

Q. " Does he know the river St. Lawrence, and how many " knots it runs on the ebb tide?"

A. " I never was there."

Q. " Have you not been informed by good accounts how " many knots it runs?"

A. " I have heard the tide is rapid there, but I never knew " with certainty at what rate."

Q. " Do you underſtand the river St. Lawrence runs as rapid " as the Delaware?"

A. " I can ſpeak with no certainty."

Q. " Do you know at what rate the Humber runs on ebb " tide?"

A. " I do not."

Q. " Do

Q. " Do you know the Severn ?"

A. " I do not."

Q. " Will you ſay that a tide, running three knots and an " half in an hour, is a rapid tide ?"

A. " I think it is a very rapid tide."

Q. " Have you not heard that the St. Lawrence runs ten " knots an hour ?"

A. " I never did."

Q. " Whether the rapidity of the tide, and the breadth of " the river, do not both of them make a great difference, in the " danger from the effects of the fire rafts ?"

A. " I conceive the ſtronger a tide runs, the danger from " fire rafts is greater, if the channel is the ſame."

Q. " Whether the fire rafts would not have floated, over any " part of that breadth of three miles, at high water, or at three " quarters tide ?"

A. " They certainly would float on every part of the river " oppoſite to Newcaſtle; but as they were directed by the gal- " lies, it is to be conceived, that they would only be uſed in " the channel."

Q. " Having ſaid that the frigates could come near enough " to fire at Newcaſtle-Bite; if the landing of the troops had been " attempted within-ſide of the frigates, and the frigates ranged " round to protect them, whether the enemy's gallies would have " ventured within fire of the frigates ?"

A. " The enemy's water force was conſtructed to fire in the " ſtream of the tide; the tide ran too rapid for the ſhips of war " to ride with ſprings upon their cables. I had before found the " gallies very troubleſome, and very little in my power to annoy " them; and therefore do conceive, as they had increaſed their " force from the time I had been laſt up the river, they certainly " would not have been idle on ſo important an occaſion to " themſelves."

Q. " Did

Q. " Did the gallies ever venture within fair reach of your " guns, ſo as to engage ?"

A. " Yes, within point blank ſhot."

Q. " Did they hold any engagement with you ?

A. " They had two engagements with me, the one five " hours, and the other ſix, on two different days."

Q. " When was that ?"

A. " The 7th and 8th of May, 1776."

Q. " Were they only gallies, or were there frigates with " them ?"

A. " Only thirteen gallies, attended by fire-ſhips."

Q. " What execution did they do on board your ſhip ?"

Q. " They killed two men, wounded ſix, damaged the maſt " very materially, and rendered all the ſails uſeleſs."

Q. " Was that in the two days engagements of eleven hours ?"

A. " Yes ; I have ſpoken to that time."

Q. " What force had you then ?"

A. " The Roebuck of 44 guns, Liverpool of 28 guns, and " two armed tenders."

Q. " Was that the damage done on board all the veſſels, or " to your own only ?"

A. " What I mentioned before, was only in the Roebuck."

Q. " What was the damage with regard to the other ſhips ?"

A. " The Liverpool ſuffered in her maſts and ſails, ſeveral " men were wounded, but I do not recollect any were killed."

Q. " How many frigates had Lord Howe on the 30th of July ?"

A. " To the beſt of my recollection, three. In the Dela- " ware with the Roebuck, there were three more."

Q. " How

Q. " How many fifty gun ſhips?"

A. " I think two."

Q. " Do you know what damage you did to the gallies?"

A. " I never heard diſtinctly, but I believe not a great deal; " they were ſuch ſmall objects, it was very difficult to ſtrike " them with cannon ſhot."

Q. " Could the gallies have effected their purpoſe of em- " ploying the fire rafts with effect, without coming within fair " gun ſhot of the frigates?"

A. " When the rebels burnt any fire rafts, the rebel gallies " never quitted them, till they were within half gun ſhot."

Q. " What ſhips, to your knowledge, did the rebels ever " attack with fire rafts, and with what effect?"

A. " They attacked the ſquadron under my command ſeveral " times with fire rafts—the firſt time off of Cheſter, where " the channel is about one third of a mile wide; the " ſhips were employed in taking men on board, when the " enemy came down with the fire rafts—they came within half " gun ſhot before they lighted the fire rafts; at the ſame time " they diſcharged their guns from the gallies—the tide run very " ſtrong—the ſhips were obliged to ſlip their cables, to prevent " the fire rafts being on board them, and to give the boats an " opportunity to tow the fire rafts off. When the ſhips caſt, " their guns reached the gallies, which drove the gallies off, and " permitted the boats to tow the fire rafts on ſhore; the ſhips at " this time run a great riſque of running a-ground, but fortu- " nately eſcaped."

Q. " Did you not ſay, that this happened where the river " was only one third of a mile wide; and that at Newcaſtle there " is a two mile wide navigable channel?"

A. " Yes, I did; what I mentioned happened off of Cheſter, " where there is an iſland that lies directly off, from which a " ſhoal extends, ſo as to reduce the channel within one third of " a mile."

Q. " Do

Q. " Do you know of an inſtance of any fire raft laying hold " of one of our ſhips, and ſetting it on fire?"

A. " I do not; the precautions that were taken prevented it."

Q. " Might not the noble Admiral's ſkill and precaution " have equally prevented it at Newcaſtle, if the fleet had pro- " ceeded there, after the 30th of July?"

A. " If the fleet had all arrived off of Wilmington, I do con- " ceive it would then have been ſo capital an object to the " enemy, that they would have employed all their force in the " night to have effected ſuch a purpoſe; and if they had done " ſo, and conducted their expedition with any ſpirit, they muſt " certainly have put the fleet into very great confuſion, as we " had no boats whatſoever, of a nature ſufficient to have with- " ſtood their thirty-ſix row-boats, and thirteen gallies."

Q. " If the frigates had been placed on the outſide " round the veſſels landing the troops, how would the gallies " and row-boats have paſſed the frigates, or how would they have " ventured to paſs them, in your opinion?"

A. " As the enemy poſſeſſed both ſhores, I think it exceed- " ingly poſſible for the gallies to have paſſed within the frigates, " and towed their fire rafts down to the fleet."

Q. " The river being ſtated to be three miles broad, what " aſſiſtance could the rebels, from being in poſſeſſion of the eaſt " ſhore, be able to give to the gallies and row-boats, coming " down cloſe along the weſt ſhore, at three miles diſtance, as " they muſt neceſſarily have done, to moleſt our troops on their " landing?"

A. " The gallies would require no aſſiſtance from the ſhore; " they could come to any point, and lay in ſhoal water, until " they had effected their purpoſe; and then have run into any " creek above or below, as it would ſuit their purpoſe."

Q. " Whether the ſhoal water does not lie to the eaſtward " of the channel, in which our ſhips would have laid, to cover " the landing of the troops?"

A. " There

A. " There is ſhoal water on each ſide in every part, except " at the town of Newcaſtle."

Q. " There being then no ſhoal water at the town of New- " caſtle, whether the gallies coming down, and getting into " ſhoal water, to the eaſtward of the channel, could have pre- " vented our troops landing, by directing the fire rafts againſt " them, or otherwiſe?"

A. " I do not apprehend the gallies would have laid on the " eaſt ſide, in caſe of any landing at Newcaſtle; they would " have employed themſelves to have oppoſed the landing on the " weſt ſhore."

Q. " Would the gallies then have had any advantage from " ſhoal water?"

A. " They would; I have only ſaid, there is no ſhoal at " the town of Newcaſtle; above and below there is ſhoal water.

Q. " Could the gallies have laid any where on the weſt " ſhore within our frigates, to have done any ſervice, without " being fully expoſed to the fire of our frigates?"

A. " Yes, I think they could. There are ſo many little " inlets and creeks, both above and below Newcaſtle, that the " gallies could place themſelves in, and, from the lowneſs of " the marſh, do execution with their guns, when the frigates " could ſee nothing but their maſts."

Q. " Could not the fire of the frigates fairly reach the " ſhore?"

A. " I have declared that it is only a gun ſhot from ſhore " to ſhore, except juſt above Newcaſtle."

Q. " How near could a 36 gun frigate lie to the ſhore " oppoſite Newcaſtle?"

A. " Along-ſide of the wharf."

Q. " How near could a 50 gun ſhip lie?"

A. " Within a very little as near."

Q. " Whether

Q. " Whether he knew, previous to the 30th of July, any " one battery of the enemy mounted along the river below " Billingſport?"

A. " No. I did not."

Q. " Did he know of any body of troops ſtationed at any " place along the weſtern ſide of the river?"

A. " I have ſaid, that I received information, that General " Waſhington was there with his army."

Q. " Whether your intelligence went ſo far as to ſay, that " General Waſhington, or any part of his army, were arrived " ſo far as Wilmington?"

A. " The intelligence I received was from perſons who had " never deceived me; therefore I had every reaſon to ſuppoſe " that it was true. The intelligence I gave the Admiral was, that " General Waſhington had croſſed the Delaware with his army, " and was gone to take poſt at Wilmington."

Q. " Had the enemy any water guard, or any defences afloat, " or defences on ſhore, in Cheſapeak-Bay, when the fleet " went up?"

A. " None."

Q. " Had the rebels any troops poſted on the ſhore?"

A. " None, that I heard of."

Q. " What is the breadth of the navigable channel of the " Delaware at Newcaſtle?"

A. " Nearly two miles."

Q. " Suppoſe a landing attempted at Newcaſtle, when part " of the troops were landed, ſome in boats, and ſome on board, " and that the row gallies had obliged the ſhips to ſlip their " cables to avoid the fire rafts, or had otherwiſe by thoſe fire " rafts diſarranged the fleet, what might have been the conſe- " quence in that ſituation?"

A. " I conceive it would have been attended with the worſt " of conſequences; in ſo narrow a channel as that, it would

" not have been poſſible for the fleet to have got under ſail in " the night-time."

Q. " Would it not have expoſed that part of the troops, " which were landed to be cut off?"

A. " That would depend on the force to oppoſe them."

Q. " Whether, though batteries are not erected, it is not in " the power of an enemy in force, and provided with cannon, to " bring them to bear ſo, as greatly to annoy ſhips in a river?"

A. " It certainly is."

Q. " Whether you would take on yourſelf, conſidering all " the circumſtances that came within your obſervation, to adviſe " the Delaware, as an elegible place for landing an army, conſi- " dering the force on ſhore, and the quantity and kind of force " that was on the river?"

A. " I have always been of opinion, that the landing an army " in the face of an enemy was always to be avoided, if the ſervice " can be effected by any other means."

Q. " Was there any thing particular in the circumſtances of " things, in the Delaware at that time, which could make an " exception from that general rule, in favour of a landing?"

A. " None that I ſaw."

Q. " Whether, independent of the intelligence you had re- " ceived concerning General Waſhington's army, you had heard " of any other troops being on the weſtern ſide of the Delaware, " at that time?"

A. " I knew of the militia belonging to each county being " ſtationed there, and there was no part, from Cedar Creek to " Reedy Iſland, that a boat could land at, without a body of " armed men coming down to oppoſe it."

Q. " Had you any intelligence of the number of which the " militia conſiſted, on the weſtern ſide of the Delaware, at that " time?"

A. " The

A. " The regiments of militia in each county were generally " reckoned at 4 or 500 men. There was a Brigadier-General of " the name of Rodney, who had the command of them."

Q. " Whether by the militia, you mean the militia of the " Lower Counties on the Delaware?"

A. " Yes, I do."

Q. " What is the diſtance from Cape Hinlopen to Cape " Charles, at the mouth of Cheſapeak Bay?"

A. " Between 140 and 150 miles."

Q. " Did you give your advice and opinion to Lord Howe, " on the 30th of July, to leave the Delaware, and go by " Cheſapeak Bay?"

A. " As I never was publickly conſulted, I never gave any " publick advice."

Q. " Whether the various obſtructions you have ſtated, to " prevent the army from landing in the Delaware, and the fleet " proceeding up the river, were not known before Lord Howe " arrived off of the mouth of the Delaware, all except General " Waſhington's army being on the march towards Wilmington?"

A. " I never informed the Admiral of the nature of thoſe " obſtructions—whether he knew them from any other quarter, " I cannot ſay."

Q. " Might not the Admiral have been fully informed on " that ſubject, before he ſailed from New-York?"

A. " He certainly might; and I ſhould rather ſuppoſe he was."

Q. " How long did the fleet delay their courſe off the Dela- " ware?"

A. " Not two hours."

Q. " How was the wind then?"

A. " Northerly—the wind was ſoutherly ſome time before " —the north wind juſt then ſprung up."

Q. " How

Q. " How long did the wind continue at north?"

A. " Till that evening, and no longer."

Q. " Which are the winds that generally prevail on the " coaſt towards the latter end of July?"

A. " The ſouth wind prevails; but frequently the weſt and " north-weſt, particularly in the night time."

Q. " When you ſpoke of the damage likely to be done by " the fire rafts, did you not mean to confine yourſelf to their " operation in the night?"

A. " Yes, I did—but as the enemy was alſo provided with " fire ſhips, I conceive thoſe might have been uſed alſo in the " day-time, with as much effect againſt a fleet at anchor, as the " fire rafts might have been in the night."

Q. " Do you think, with the wind ſoutherly, the enemy " could have given any obſtruction to the fleet, ſufficient to " impede its courſe, before it came to Reedy-Iſland?"

A. " I conceive not, if we had been certain that the ſoutherly " winds would have laſted—I ſhould obſerve, that the ſoutherly " winds blow only in the day-time, and the northerly winds " prevail in the night-time."

Q. " How many hours ſail is it from Reedy-Iſland to New- " caſtle, with a fair wind and flowing tide?"

A. " With a ſingle ſhip, not above an hour—but with a " fleet, it is a very different thing."

Q. " Suppoſing the ſhips had run up to Newcaſtle with a " ſoutherly wind, and a flowing tide, in the day-time, was it " poſſible for either fire ſhips, fire rafts, or gallies, to have " diſturbed them, or prevented their landing troops, if there had " been no reſiſtance by an enemy on the ſhore?"

A. " I conceive if the fleet had gone up the Delaware, the " rebels would naturally have brought their water force down to " the fleet; that if the fleet had got under way, with the oppor- " tunity that the honourable gentleman has ſtated, they would

" naturally

" naturally have gone before the fleet; and when they ſtopped, " in order to land the troops, the gallies would naturally have " taken their poſition."

Q. " Then all the obſtructions, which you conceive might " have been made, would have been from all the gallies, and not " from the fire ſhips, or fire rafts—Is that your meaning?"

A. " The fire ſhips and fire rafts could not have acted, under " the circumſtances of a fair wind and flowing tide."

Q. " Is it your opinion, that any number of gallies off New- " caſtle, which you admit to be ſo ſteep to the ſhore, that a " frigate could come to the wharf, and a fifty gun ſhip almoſt " as near, could have given any ſerious obſtruction to the land- " ing of an army at that place?"

A. " I never pretended to deny the practicability of landing " an army in the Delaware—I have only ſpoke to the expediency " of it."

Q. " Do you know what depth of water there is in the " Narrows in the Delaware?"

A. " The Narrows is a ſtrait between two ſhoals, in which " there is deep water, not leſs than ſix or ſeven fathom, but it is " extremely narrow."

Q. " What depth of water is there in the Flats above?"

A. " On the Flats of Morris Liſton's, which are the worſt " flats on the river, at high water there is only twenty-five feet, " or twenty-ſix—that is, quite at high water."

Q. " Do you know the North or Hudſon's River?"

A. " No farther than Haverſtraw-Bay."

Q. " Do you know the King's Ferry?"

A. " No."

Q. " What depth of water is there at Morris Liſton's at " low water?"

A. " The tide riſes and falls about eight feet."

Q. " Did you underſtand, that, on the 30th of July, the " enemy had a corps of troops at Wilmington?"

A. " I was ſo informed."

Q. " Was you informed what was the communication from " Newcaſtle, to the interior part of the country, to the head " of Elk?"

A. " It has the Chriſtien River on its right, which runs up " at leaſt ten or twelve miles before it is fordable."

Q. " Is Newcaſtle ſituated on a peninſula?"

A. " I am not very well acquainted with the lower parts of " its ſituation; it has George River on its left, but at ſome " diſtance."

Q. " Whether, from the ſuperiority of metal of the rebel " veſſels in the Delaware, they could not have ſtationed them- " ſelves in ſuch a manner, as to have annoyed any frigates, even " with the aſſiſtance of a fifty-gun ſhip, that might have been " deſtined to cover the landing of any body of troops, without " being hurt by thoſe ſhips with any probable effect?"

A. " I think, if they had had time and opportunity to have " placed them, they would have made the landing very difficult."

Q. " Do you know how far it is from Newcaſtle to Cecil- " Court Houſe?"

A. " About ſeventeen miles."

Q. " Whether, in the march from Newcaſtle to Cecil- " Court Houſe, it would have been neceſſary to ford the " Chriſtien, or any other river whatſoever?"

A. " I have no knowledge of the interior part of that " country, but from the map."

Q. " In what part of the Delaware was the water force of " the rebels, on the 30th of July?"

A. " Part at Reedy-Iſland, and part at Mud-Iſland."

Q. " What

Q. " What part was at Reedy-Iſland ?"

A. " The brig galley, the ſchooner galley, and ſeveral of " the latteen gallies--and ſeveral of their row boats."

Q. " What part was at Mud-Iſland ?"

A. " All the remaining part of the force."

Q. " What is the diſtance from Mud-Iſland to Reedy- " Iſland ?"

" A. Twenty-five, or twenty-ſix miles, in the courſe of the " river."

Q. " How high in the Delaware can a ſixty-four gun ſhip go ?"

A. " If there had been no obſtructions in the river, a ſixty- " four gun ſhip might be carried to Philadelphia at high water."

Q. " Where does the firſt obſtruction begin in the river ?"

A. " At Billingſport."

Q. " How far is Billingſport above Newcaſtle ?"

A. " About twenty miles."

Q. " Whether a ſixty-four gun ſhip can ſafely lie a good " way above Newcaſtle, at all times of tide ?"

A. " A ſixty-four gun ſhip can at all times lie as high as " Cheſter."

Q. " Muſt not the fleet have anchored every night in their " way up the Delaware ?"

" A. Certainly; it would not have been practicable to have " kept under ſail."

Q. " How many ſeamen were neceſſary for manning the " flat boats, for landing the army ?"

A. " I do not recollect how many—but I know, when the " flat boats were manned, we had but very few men left on " board the ſhips."

 Q. " Whether

Q. " Whether the ſeamen, for manning the flat boats, muſt " not be taken from the line of battle ſhips?"

A. " That was the uſual method practiſed, in order to make " the frigates uſeful."

Q. " What number of boats were prepared for the landing?"

A. " To the beſt of my recollection, ſeventy-nine."

Q. " Would not that have taken upwards of 800 ſeamen to " have manned them properly?"

A. " They were uſually manned with twelve men, a cock- " ſwain, and officer, each."

Q. " Whether when you ſtated, that the firſt obſtruction in " the Delaware was at Billingſport, you intended to have it un- " derſtood, that no obſtruction might be given to the courſe of " the fleet, or the landing of the army, at any place of the ſhore " below Billingſport?"

A. " When I mentioned the firſt obſtruction being at " Billingſport, I meant only as to the Chevaux de frize, which " the enemy had ſtopped the channel with under water."

Q. " Did you mean to ſay that no army at land, having no " batteries erected on the land below that Chevaux de frize, " would have been an obſtruction to a fleet coming up the Dela- " ware?"

A. " If the fleet had proceeded up the river, they would " have gone for many miles through a channel, where it was " only a ſhort gun ſhot, in many places, from ſide to ſide—it is " therefore not to be preſumed, that the enemy would have loſt " the opportunity of annoying the fleet, from every advantageous " point."

Q. " Does this anſwer relate to the river above, or at, and " below Newcaſtle?"

A. " It relates principally to the parts above Newcaſtle, but " alſo to ſome parts below."

Q. " Whether

Q. " Whether the fleet, in going up the Cheſapeak Bay, " were not obliged to caſt anchor every night, even though there " was no obſtruction from the enemy ?"

A. " They were—it is not poſſible in ſo narrow a navigation " for the fleet to continue under ſail during the night."

Q. " Whether, in conſequence of thoſe difficulties in " Cheſapeak-Bay, the troops were not landed a month later, " than they would have been at Newcaſtle, if a landing could " have been effected there ?"

A. " I do not conceive, that a fleet, being obliged to anchor " in the night, can be conſidered a difficulty—the army was " certainly landed later by about three weeks, than they might " have been by going up the Delaware, but it happened to be " a very uncommon and very unuſual paſſage. When the fleet " left the mouth of the Delaware, the wind was northerly, and " there was great reaſon to expect, that the fleet would have got " to the head of Cheſapeak Bay in leſs than a week. It hap- " pened otherwiſe, on account of the ſouth winds ſetting in, " which was attended with ſuch uncommon hot weather, that, " if the troops had been on ſhore at that time, they muſt have " ſuffered exceedingly."

Q. " How far was the fleet advanced from the mouth of the " Delaware when they met the ſoutherly winds ?"

A. " About ten leagues."

Q. " What number of ſoldiers did each boat take for land- " ing, beſides the ſeamen to conduct it ?"

A. " That depends on the diſtance they have to go, and the " opportunity they have for landing—in ſmooth water, and to go " a ſhort way, they might carry about forty-five men."

Q. " At how many turns, could the ſeventy-nine boats have " landed the whole army ?"

A. " That depends totally on the diſtance they have to go; " it is a matter of calculation. I do not know how many troops " they had to land."

 Q. " What

Q. " What way do you conceive a fleet, of men of war and " tranſports, could make againſt a tide of three and an half " knots, with an unfavourable wind; but ſuch as would permit " them to lie their courſe, ſuppoſing moderate weather?"

A. " The channel in the Delaware is ſo extremely narrow " amongſt the ſhoals, that unleſs the wind had been fair, the " progreſs of the fleet muſt have been very ſlow indeed."

Q. " You will anſwer the ſame queſtion; but ſuppoſing the " wind to be a-head, or ſo near a-head, that they would be " obliged to make way by turning or tacking; ſtill ſuppoſing " moderate weather, and this too in the Delaware?"

A. " With the wind and tide contrary, the fleet could make " no way at all, but muſt lie at anchor."

Q. " Have you not had much experience in the Delaware?"

A. " I was a long time there."

Q. How long did you ever know a ſingle ſhip detained, from " going up the river, in the months of July or Auguſt, after ſhe " got within the Capes?"

A. " About three days, between the Capes and Reedy-" Iſland. I am ſpeaking of a ſingle ſhip, and not of a fleet."

Q. " Did not the tranſports furniſh ſeamen to man the boats " for landing the troops?"

A. " When the tranſports were in a ſtate of ſecurity, they " frequently did; but not when they were to move; they were " not then able from their complement of men."

Q " How many days did the wind ſtand to the ſouthward, " after you left the Delaware?"

A. " The wind was variable; there were frequent calms " which delayed the fleet."

Q. " Was the wind in general, a north or ſouth wind?"

A. " In general ſoutherly?"

Q. " Was

Q. " Was not that a fair wind to carry the fleet to New-
" caſtle ?"

A. " If they had been in the Delaware, it certainly would."

Q. " In how many tides would the fleet have gone to New-
" caſtle from the Capes, with that wind ?"

A. " It is impoſſible to anſwer that queſtion—it depends on
" circumſtances—the fleet were very ill provided with pilots—
" there were only eight or nine pilots to 250 ſail."

Q. " As the winds and tides then were, all circumſtances
" conſidered, how ſoon do you think the fleet might have reached
" Newcaſtle ?"

A. " If I could be aſſured the fleet would keep in the right
" channel, and no accident at all would happen, I could then
" be able to anſwer the queſtion."

Q. " Was not your ſhip ſtationed the foremoſt towards
" Brooklyn Ferry, the 27th and 28th of Auguſt, 1776 ?"

A. " My ſhip was employed with the others on that ſervice."

Q. " Was not your ſhip, or any other, ſo ſtationed, as to
" have the view of Brooklyn Ferry, ſo open, as neceſſarily to
" ſee the boats paſs backwards and forwards, between Brooklyn
" and New-York ?"

A. " My ſhip was not, nor any other."

Q. " Whether, in paſſing up the Cheſapeak or Delaware, the
" ſhips and tranſports were not neceſſarily obliged to keep very
" much together, in ſailing through narrow channels ?"

A. " The tranſports were neceſſarily obliged to keep cloſe to
" the men of war, and alſo cloſe to each other, in order to pre-
" vent getting a-ground, and the few pilots could only be diſtri-
" buted to the men of war."

Q. " If, when the tranſports were in that confined ſituation,
" by change of wind (the tide ceaſing) they ſhould be obliged
" to anchor, would it not be neceſſary they ſhould ſeparate con-
" ſiderably

" ſiderably from each other, to prevent their falling on board " each other?"

A. " The ſhips would certainly do ſo, as much as they " could."

Q. " How long would it have taken the rebels, to have " brought their water force at Mud-Iſland, down to Reedy-" Iſland?"

A. " In one ebb tide."

Q. " How long does the flood and ebb tide run in the " Delaware?"

A. " Ebb runs about ſeven hours, and flood about five."

Q. " Suppoſing the wind, which was northerly when the " fleet quitted the mouth of the Delaware, had continued in " that quarter, how long would it have taken that fleet to have " got up to Newcaſtle?"

A. " The fleet would not have got to Newcaſtle in ten days " with a north wind."

Q. " How long could a great ſhip get up from Reedy Iſland " to Newcaſtle, before it was high water?"

A. " Suppoſing the ſhip to have been at anchor at Reedy-" Iſland, I conceive, if the weather had been moderate, and " they had met with no accident, they might have reached " Newcaſtle an hour before high water."

Q. " How many ſhips could have anchored at Newcaſtle, " where you have ſaid the water was ſo deep cloſe to the ſhore?"

A. " I do not exactly know, but ſeveral might have anchored " there."

Q. " What proportion of the fleet of 250 ſail?"

A. " A very ſmall part."

Q. " Muſt not the reſt have anchored ſome miles both above " and below it?"

A. " Certainly

A. " Certainly they muſt—I do not conceive that fleet could " have been anchored in leſs than four or five miles of ground."

Q. " Would they not then, as ſoon as the ebb tide made, " have been open to the attack of the enemy's gallies, fire ſhips, " and fire rafts, notwithſtanding the frigates that were ſuppoſed " to be placed oppoſite the town of Newcaſtle?"

A. " They certainly would, and I do not believe the enemy " would have loſt the opportunity."

Q. " Could any ſhip have been ſo ſtationed to open Brooklyn " Ferry, ſo as to obſerve the boats paſs and repaſs to and from " New-York."

A. " I think not, without being expoſed to the batteries of the " enemy?"

Q. " Whether, informed, as you was, of the navigation of " the Cheſapeak Bay, and the navigation of the Delaware, with " the water defence that you underſtood to have been prepared " for that route, had you commanded the fleet of 250 ſail, " would you have preferred going up the Delaware, to going up " Cheſapeak Bay?"

A. " Informed, as I was, of every circumſtance reſpecting " the Cheſapeak Bay and the Delaware, I was of opinion then, " and am of the ſame opinion ſtill, that the going up Cheſapeak " Bay was a very wiſe and proper meaſure."

Page 73, 74, and 75.

Theſe pages contain a criticiſm upon the battle of Brandywine, and upon my ſubſequent conduct. In anſwer to which I ſhall refer to the more reſpectable profeſſional opinions of Earl Cornwallis and Major-General Grey.

Evidence of EARL CORNWALLIS.

Q. " Did your Lordſhip concur with Sir William Howe in " the propriety of dividing the army, to bring the enemy to " action at Brandywine?"

A, " The

A. "The manœuvre that brought on the action of Brandy-
" wine certainly reflects the higheſt honour on the General. As
" I have already refuſed to inform this Houſe whether I concurred
" in other operations, I have no right to take any merit from
" concurring in this."

Q. "Did your Lordſhip obſerve, that any advantage was loſt,
" which might have been taken, in conſequence of that batte?"

A. "I did not ſee that any advantage was loſt."

Evidence of MAJOR GENERAL GREY.

Q. "Was you of opinion, that the diviſion of the army, to
" bring the enemy to action at Brandywine, was judicious and
" expedient?"

A. "I think the diviſion of the army before the battle of
" Brandywine was a maſterly movement, deceived the enemy,
" and brought on the action with almoſt a certainty of ſucceſs."

Q. "Did you obſerve, that any advantage was loſt, that might
" have been taken, in conſequence of that battle?"

A. "I know of none."

I here beg leave to inſert an extract of my letter of the 10th of October, 1777, to the Secretary of State, which contains a journal of my operations immediately previous, and ſubſequent to the battle of Brandywine.

Extract of a Letter from SIR WILLIAM HOWE *to* LORD GEORGE GERMAIN, N°. 68, *dated Head-Quarters, German-Town, October 10th*, 1777.

"ON the 3d of September (Major General Grant, with ſix
" battalions, remaining at the Head of Elk, to preſerve the
" communication with the fleet) the two columns (*under Earl
" Cornwallis and General Knyphauſen*) joined at Pencadder,
" four miles to the eaſtward of Elk, on the road to Chriſtien-
" Bridge. In this day's march the Heſſian and Anſpach chaſ-
" ſeurs, and the ſecond battalion of light infantry, who were at

" the

" the head of Lord Cornwallis's column, fell in with a choſen
" corps of 1000 men from the enemy's army, advantageouſly
" poſted in the woods, which they defeated with the loſs only
" of two officers wounded,—three men killed, and nineteen
" wounded,—when that of the enemy was not leſs than fifty
" killed, and many more wounded.

" On the 6th, Major General Grant, after Captain Duncan,
" who ſuperintended the naval department, had deſtroyed ſuch
" veſſels and ſtores as could not be removed from the Head of
" Elk, joined the army. The whole marched on the 8th by
" Newark, and encamped that evening in the Townſhip of Ho-
" keſſen, upon the road leading from Newport to Lancaſter, at
" which firſt place General Waſhington had taken poſt, having
" his left to Chriſtien-Creek, and his front covered by Red
" Clay-Creek.

" The two armies in this ſituation being only four miles apart,
" the enemy moved, early in the night of the 8th, by the Lancaſter-
" Road, from Wilmington, and about ten o'clock next morning
" croſſed Brandywine-Creek at Chads-Ford, taking poſt on the
" heights on the eaſtern ſide of it.

" On the 9th in the afternoon, Lieut. General Knyphauſen
" marched with the left of the army to New-Garden and
" Kennets-Square, while Lord Cornwallis, with the right,
" moved to Hokeſſen meeting-Houſe, and both joined the next
" morning at Kennets-Square.

" On the 11th at day-break, the army advanced in two
" columns, the right commanded by Lieut. General Knyphauſen,
" conſiſting of four Heſſian battalions under Major General Stirn;
" the firſt and ſecond brigades of Britiſh, three battalions of the
" ſeventy-firſt regiment, the Queen's American Rangers, and
" one ſquadron of dragoons, under Major General Grant, having
" with them ſix medium twelve-pounders, four howitzers, and
" the light artillery belonging to the brigades: this column took
" the direct road to Chads Ford, ſeven miles diſtant from
" Kennets Square, and arrived in front of the enemy about ten
" o'clock, ſkirmiſhing moſt part of the march with their ad-
" vanced troops, in which the Queen's American Rangers, com-

" manded

" manded by Capt. Wemys of the fortieth regiment, diſtin-
" guiſhed themſelves in a particular manner.

" The other column, under the command of Lord Cornwallis,
" Major General Grey, Brigadier Generals Mathew and Agnew,
" conſiſting of the mounted and diſmounted chaſſeurs, two
" ſquadrons of the 16th dragoons, two battalions of light
" infantry, two Battalions of Britiſh, and three of Heſſian gre-
" nadiers, two battalions of guards, the third and fourth
" brigades, with four light twelve-pounders, and the artillery
" of the brigades, marched about twelve miles to the forks of
" the Brandywine, croſſed the firſt branch at Trimble's-Ford, and
" the ſecond at Jeffery's-Ford, about two o'clock in the after-
" noon, taking from thence the road to Dilworth, in order to
" turn the enemy's right at Chads-Ford.

" General Waſhington, having intelligence of this movement
" about noon, detached General Sullivan to his right, with near
" 10,000 men, who took a ſtrong poſition on the commanding
" ground above Birmingham-Church, with his left near to the
" Brandywine, both flanks being covered by very thick woods,
" and his artillery advantageouſly diſpoſed.

" As ſoon as this was obſerved, which was about four o'clock,
" the King's troops advanced in three columns, and, upon ap-
" proaching the enemy, formed the line, with the right towards
" Brandywine. The guards were upon the right, and the
" Britiſh grenadiers upon their left, ſupported by the Heſſian
" grenadiers in a ſecond line: to the left of the centre were the
" two battalions of light infantry with the Heſſian and Anſpach
" chaſſeurs, ſupported by the fourth brigade. The third bri-
" gade formed the reſerve.

" Lord Cornwallis having formed the line, the light infantry
" and chaſſeurs began the attack; the guards and grenadiers in-
" ſtantly advanced from the right, the whole under a heavy fire
" of artillery and muſquetry; but they puſhed on with an im-
" petuoſity not to be ſuſtained by the enemy, who falling back
" into the woods in their rear, the King's troops entered with
" them, and purſued cloſely for near two miles."

" After

" After this ſucceſs, a part of the enemy's right took a ſecond " poſition in a wood about half a mile from Dilworth, from " whence the ſecond light infantry and chaſſeurs ſoon diſlodged " them, and from this time they did not rally again in force.

" The firſt Britiſh grenadiers, the Heſſian grenadiers, and " guards, having in the purſuit got entangled in very thick " woods, were no farther engaged during the day.

" The ſecond light infantry, and ſecond grenadiers, and fourth " brigade, moved forward a mile beyond Dilworth, where they " attacked a corps of the enemy, that had not been before en- " gaged, and were ſtrongly poſted to cover the retreat of their " army, by the roads from Chads-Ford to Cheſter and Wil- " mington, which corps not being forced until after it was dark, " when the troops had undergone much fatigue in a march of " ſeventeen miles, beſides what they ſupported ſince the com- " mencement of the attack, the enemy's army eſcaped a total " overthrow, that muſt have been the conſequence of an hour's " more day-light.

" The third brigade was not brought into action, but kept in " reſerve, in the rear of the fourth brigade, it not being known " before it was dark, how far Lieutenant-General Knyphauſen's " attack had ſucceeded; nor was there an opportunity of em- " ploying the cavalry.

" Lieutenant-General Knyphauſen, as had been previouſly " concerted, kept the enemy amuſed in the courſe of the day " with cannon, and the appearance of forcing the ford, without " intending to paſs it, until the attack upon the enemy's right " ſhould take place. Accordingly, when it began, Major- " General Grant croſſed the ford with the 4th and 5th regiments; " and the 4th preſſing firſt, forced the enemy from an intrench- " ment and battery, where three braſs field-pieces and a 5-inch " and a half howitzer were taken, that had been placed there to " command the ford.

" The enemy made little ſtand on that ſide after the work " was carried, when the guards appearing on their right flank, " the retreat became general; but darkneſs coming on, before

" Lieutenant-General Knyphauſen's corps could reach the " heights, there was no farther action on that ſide.

" From the moſt correct accounts, I conclude the ſtrength of " the enemy's army, oppoſed to Lieutenant-General Knyphauſen " and Lord Cornwallis, was not leſs than 15,000 men, a part of " which retired to Cheſter, and remained there that night; but " the greater body did not ſtop until they reached Philadelphia. " Their loſs was conſiderable in officers killed and wounded; " and they had about 300 men killed, 600 wounded, and near " 400 made priſoners.

" The loſs on the ſide of his Majeſty's troops, and the ord- " nance, ammunition, and ſtores taken from the enemy, will " appear in the encloſed returns.

" The army laid this night on the field of battle; and on the " 12th, Major-General Grant, with the 1ſt and 2d brigades, " marched to Concord. Lord Cornwallis, with the light in- " fantry and Britiſh grenadiers, joined him next day, and pro- " ceeded to Aſhtown, within five miles of Cheſter.

" On the ſame day (the 13th) the 71ſt regiment was detached " to Wilmington, where the enemy had thrown up works, both " to the land and to the river, with ſeven pieces of cannon in " the latter; but theſe works being evacuated, Major Mac " Donell took poſſeſſion of the place without oppoſition, and " made Mr. M'Kinley, the new-appointed Preſident of the Lower " Counties on Delaware, his priſoner.

" On the 14th, Lieutenant-Colonel Loos, with the combined " battalion of Rhall's brigade, eſcorted the wounded and ſick " to Wilmington, whither the battalion of Mirbach was ſent " two days afterwards to join him.

" The army moved in two columns towards Goſhen on the " 16th; and intelligence being received upon the march, that " the enemy was advancing upon the Lancaſter road, and were " within five miles of Goſhen, it was immediately determined to " puſh forward the two columns, and attack them; Lord Corn-

" wallis

" wallis to take his route by Goſhen meeting-houſe, and Lieu-
" tenant-General Knyphauſen by the road to Downingtown.

" The two diviſions proceeded on their march, but a moſt
" violent fall of rain ſetting in, and continuing the whole day
" and night without intermiſſion, made the intended attack im-
" practicable.

" The firſt light infantry, at the head of Lord Cornwallis's
" column, meeting with a part of the enemy's advanced guard
" about a mile beyond Goſhen, defeated them, killing twelve,
" and wounding more without the loſs of a man.

" Nearly at the ſame time the chaſſeurs, in front of Lieute-
" nant-General Knyphauſen's column, fell in with another
" party, of which they killed an officer and five men, and took
" four officers priſoners, with the loſs of three men wounded.

" The enemy, being thus appriſed of the approach of the
" army, marched with the utmoſt precipitation the whole night
" of the 16th, and got in the morning to the Yellow Springs, hav-
" ing, as it is ſince known, all their ſmall ammunition damaged
" by the exceſſive rain.

" In the morning of the 17th, Lord Cornwallis advanced to
" the Lancaſter Road, and took poſt about two miles diſtant from
" Lieutenant-General Knyphauſen.

" The army joined in the Lancaſter Road at the White
" Horſe on the 18th, and marched to Truduffrin, from whence a
" detachment of light infantry was immediately ſent to the Valley
" Forge upon Schuylkill, where the enemy had a variety of
" ſtores, and a conſiderable magazine of flour. The 1ſt Battalion of
" light infantry, and the Britiſh grenadiers, took poſt there
" next day, and where joined on the 20th by the guards.

" The enemy croſſed the Schuylkill on the 18th above French
" Creek, and encamped upon the river, on each ſide of
" Perkyomy Creek, having detached troops to all the forts of
" Schuylkill, with cannon at Swedes Fort, and the forts below it.

" Upon intelligence that General Wayne was lying in the
" woods, with a corps of 1500 men, and four pieces of cannon,

" about

" about three miles diſtant, and in the rear of the left wing of
" the army, Major General Grey was detached on the 20th late
" at night, with the 2d Light Infantry, the 42d and 44th regi-
" ments, to ſurpriſe this corps. The moſt effectual precautions
" being taken by the General to prevent his detachment from
" firing, he gained the enemy's left about one o'clock; and
" having, by the bayonet only, forced their out ſentries, and
" Pickets, he ruſhed in upon the encampment, directed by
" the light of the fires, killed and wounded not leſs then 300
" on the ſpot, taking between 70 and 80 priſoners, the greater
" part of their arms, and eight waggons loaded with baggage
" and ſtores. Upon the firſt alarm the cannon were carried
" off, and the darkneſs of the night, only, ſaved the reſt of the
" corps. One captain of light infantry, and three men, were
" killed in the attack, and four men wounded. Gallantry in
" the troops, and good conduct in the General, were fully
" manifeſted upon this critical ſervice.

" On the 21ſt, the army moved by Valley Forge, and encamp-
" ed upon the banks of the Schuylkill, extending from Fat-
" Land Ford to French Creek. The enemy upon this move-
" ment quitted their poſition, and marched towards Pots-
" Grove in the evening of this day.

" On the 22d, the grenadiers and light infantry of the guards
" croſſed over to take poſt; and the chaſſeurs croſſing ſoon
" after at Gordon's Ford, oppoſite to the left of the line, took
" poſt there alſo. The army was put in motion at midnight,
" the van-guard being led by Lord Cornwallis, and the whole
" croſſed the river at Fat-Land Ford without oppoſition.
" Major General Grant, who commanded the rear guard with
" the baggage, paſſed the river before two o'clock in the after-
" noon; and the army encamped on the 23d with its left to the
" Schuylkill, and the right upon the Monatony road, having
" Stony Run in front. The two battalions of light infantry
" were detached to Swedes Ford, which a ſmall party of the
" enemy immediately quitted, leaving ſix pieces of iron cannon
" behind them.

" On the 25th, the army marched in two columns to German
" Town

" Town, and Lord Cornwallis, with the Britiſh grenadiers, " and two battalions of Heſſian grenadiers, took poſſeſſion of " Philadelphia the next morning."

Page 76.] " *A fall of rain prevented the intended attack.*"

This aſſertion is meant by the author as a ſarcaſm. Major-General Grey's evidence proves, that this attack " was prevented " by the weather, which rendered it *impoſſible* ;" that is, it prevented the troops and artillery from getting forward. The latter did not come to their ground until it was dark.——But as the author thinks it ridiculous that a fall of rain ſhould prevent the operations of an army, I will ſubjoin the evidence of Earl Cornwallis, who was examined to that very point. —

Q. " Was there not a time, at the White Plains, when our " army lay on their arms, intending to attack the enemy, but " were prevented by rain ?"

A. " After the enemy fell back to the heights near North " Caſtle, they left an advanced corps on the heights of the White " Plains. There were orders given for an attack of that corps, " which was prevented by a violent rain. We did not lay upon " our arms."

Q. " From the ſituation of the rebel army and of our's, was " that ſtorm of rain in their or our faces ?"

A. " I do not apprehend that the attack was prevented by " the ſtorm of rain in either of our faces. There are other ef- " fects of a ſtorm of rain ; ſuch as ſpoiling the roads, and pre- " venting the drawing artillery up ſteep hills."

Page 78.] " *Capt. Montreſor, the chief engineer, had, before* " *the rebellion, ſurveyed Mud Iſland, and taken the bearings and* " *diſtances of the ſhores on each ſide of the river. He ſaw the ab-* " *ſolute neceſſity of repairing thoſe dykes, and ſtopping out the wa-* " *ters, before any effectual progreſs could be made in erecting the* " *batteries. A gentleman of conſiderable influence in the city, who* " *was of the ſame opinion, offered to have theſe repairs effected in* " *a few days. This was all pointed out to the Commander in Chief,* " *but, from what motive is unknown to this day, they were not per-*

" *mitted*

" mitted to be made. The workmen, obliged to work in water and " ſoft mud, laboured in vain. The work they performed in the " reflux of the tide, the influx waſhed away. Thus a month was " ſhamefully waſted, and no progreſs made towards taking the fort. " At length, Lord Cornwallis ſent for the gentleman who had of- " fered to repair the dykes, informed him that it muſt be done pre- " viouſly to the erecting of the batteries, and requeſted he would un- " dertake it. This he did with chearfulneſs; and although the " breaches were as large again as when he firſt propoſed the repairs, " the work was finiſhed in ſix days.—The batteries were immediately " erected without difficulty, and opened on the 10th."

It has been before obſerved, that orders were given to the Chief Engineer, upon the King's troops entering Philadelphia, to conſtruct redoubts, and to form the neceſſary lines of communication, for the better ſecurity of that city; that on this work he was directed to employ the inhabitants, to be furniſhed, at my particular requeſt, by *Mr. Galloway*, for the relief of the ſoldiery; and that this aſſiſtance fell far ſhort of that gentleman's aſſurances.

The neceſſity of repairing the dykes on Province and Blackeley's iſlands, before an effectual progreſs could be made in erecting batteries againſt Mud Iſland, was an object of ſtill more conſequence, and any offers to effect it, inſtead of being rejected, would have been gladly accepted. I am confident that none were made to me, and have the moſt explicit authority for ſaying, that ſuch offers having been made never arrived to the knowledge of thoſe immediately intruſted with the execution of the work. The conduct of it was under the direction of Earl Cornwallis, until I moved to Philadelphia with the main army on the 19th of October; and thoſe, who have a juſt opinion of his Lordſhip's zeal to promote his Majeſty's ſervice by every poſſible means, will hardly ſuppoſe him to have been inattentive in this eſſential point.

Eleven dyke-men were, I find, ſent to the engineer on the 22d of October, and, I am very ready to grant, were of conſiderable ſervice for the few days they aſſiſted. But it cannot be conceived that theſe men effected in *ſix days*, by their own labor, the ſtopping of breaches that had encreaſed to be *as large again*

under the efforts made to ſtop them by all the carpenters in the engineer's department, aſſiſted by thoſe in the bridge-maſter's, and the military working parties for the day: nevertheleſs, the author roundly aſſerts, that in conſequence of *their* aſſiſtance, *the batteries were immediately erected without difficulty*, and opened on the 10th of November.

The fact is, that the military carpenters, and working parties before-mentioned, labored moſt inceſſantly, from the 7th of October, under a continued fire from Mud Iſland and batteries afloat, to repair the dykes; that notwithſtanding the great interruptions from heavy rains, and high freſhes in the Delaware, 19,800 yards of banking, excluſive of roads and bridges, were repaired, ſo as to open four batteries on the 15th of October: but theſe not proving effectual, for want of heavier cannon, there was a neceſſity of procuring them from the King's ſhips.

The interval from the time the firſt batteries opened, on the 15th of October, to the arrival of the battering guns from the Eagle and Somerſet, was not *ſhamefully waſted*, but indefatigably employed in continuing the extenſive lines (two miles and a half) —tranſporting materials for throwing two bridges acroſs the Schuylkill, and in the conſtruction of two Têtes des ponts.

Page 80.] *Poſſeſſed of theſe ideas, Colonel Stirling deſired to take poſſeſſion of Red-Bank; but it was not granted him.*

This is entirely a miſrepreſentation. The affair of Red-Bank is diſcuſſed in my Narrative; and the evidences of Earl Cornwallis and Major-General Grey form a compleat anſwer to every thing that can be ſaid upon the ſubject.

Page 85.] *Men who were perfectly acquainted with the ground of Waſhington's camp (at White-Marſh) the eaſy approach to it in its rear, the variety of good roads leading to it, either on the right or left, and the great advantages which the Britiſh troops would have commanded by a movement round the camp, were aſtoniſhed at his return, without effecting any good purpoſe, eſpecially as it was well known, that Waſhington's troops were in the greateſt panic and confuſion, and prepared night and day for flight, during the time the Britiſh army lay in the neighbourhood.*

I had the beſt intelligence that the enemy's poſt was not aſſailable in the rear; and the truth of that intelligence was corroborated by ſeveral of our own officers, who went over the ground in the ſpring following. The intention of my march was to attack Waſhington, had I found it adviſeable when I came to the ſpot, and not to remain in the field in that inclement ſeaſon.—Merely to move him from that poſt was no object.

What does Major-General Grey ſay in his evidence upon this ſubject?

Q. "Do you think an attack on the enemy's army at White-"Marſh would have been adviſeable?"

A. "I think an attack of the enemy, ſo very ſtrongly ſituated "as they were at White-Marſh, would have been highly im-"prudent."

Pages 86, 87, 88, and 89, *contain a deſcription of Waſhington's ſituation at Valley-Forge in the winter of* 1777, *and ſpring of* 1778—*and an accuſation againſt me for not having attacked him in that ſituation.*

The author's plan of beſieging the enemy at Valley-Forge is in the higheſt degree abſurd. Had I made a diviſion of the troops in the manner he propoſes, I ſhould have expoſed them to be beaten in detail. I have in my Narrative given a reaſon why I ought not to have riſked an attack with ſo ſmall a proſpect of ſucceſs. Major-General Grey's evidence, however, may perhaps be deemed more deciſive.

Q. "Do you think it would have been adviſeable to have "attacked the enemy at Valley-Forge in the winter, when the "army lay at Philadelphia?"

A. "As affairs were then ſituated in America, I think an "attack on the enemy at Valley-Forge, ſo ſtrongly poſted as "they were, both by nature and art, would have been very un-"juſtifiable."

Q. "Do

Q. " Do you recollect any inſtance of Sir William Howe's " omitting any opportunity of attacking the enemy, when it " could have been done with a reaſonable proſpect of advantage, " conſidering all reſpective ſituations and circumſtances at the " time?"

A. " All circumſtances conſidered, the choice of difficulties " in carrying on a war in the ſtrongeſt country in the world, " with almoſt an unanimous people to defend it, and the number " of troops the Commander in Chief had to overcome thoſe " difficulties, I know of no inſtance wherein Sir William Howe " ever omitted attacking the enemy, or of his not doing every " thing that was poſſible to be done, to promote his Majeſty's " ſervice, and the honour of the Britiſh arms."

Page 90.] *He omitted to ſupport General Burgoyne, or even to make a diverſion on the coaſt of Maſſachuſett's-Bay in his favour, though he knew ſuch was his Majeſty's pleaſure.*

For an anſwer to this, ſee my Narrative (pages 12 and 17).

Page 90.] *And he took care not to ſuffer Sir Henry Clinton to perform thoſe important ſervices, by not leaving him ſufficient force, though the rebel army, at that time, conſiſted of leſs than one third of his own effective force.—Britiſh force* 17,000 *veteran troops.—Rebel force* 8,000 *new raiſed, undiſciplined men.*

In my Narrative (page 23) I have ſtated, that I left at New-York under the command of Sir Henry Clinton " about 8,500 " men, excluſive of ſick and convaleſcents, and excluſive of a " ſmall body of militia upon Long-Iſland." In a return now before me, dated at New-York, 1ſt of October, 1777, I find he had at that time under his immediate command, excluſive of the corps of artillery and light horſe—

Infantry, rank and file, fit for duty -	8,340
Ditto on publick employ - -	52
Ditto on command - - -	419
Ditto ſick - - - -	1,356
	10,167

My inſtructions to Sir Henry Clinton (page 28) prove that I did not loſe ſight of offenſive operations up Hudſon's river, in the event of Waſhington's following me into Pennſylvania.

The propriety of the expedition to Pennſylvania, (although approved of by his Majeſty's Secretary of State for the American department) was a long time the principal point of diſcuſſion in Parliament, and in the public prints. I therefore ſtated the ſubject fully and fairly in my Narrative: And for a farther elucidation, I refer the reader to the evidence ſince given by Major-General Grey to the Houſe of Commons reſpecting that expedition.

Page 92.] *He ſupinely ſuffered himſelf to be ſurprized at German-Town.*

I have given a candid account of the circumſtances relative to the attack made upon the King's troops at German-Town, in my Narrative (page 27), the accuracy of which I ſhall ſupport by an extract from Sir George Oſborne's evidence in the Houſe of Commons.

Q. "Do you recollect any orders you received the day before "the action at German-Town?"

A. "On that day I was to the right of the infantry, with "the grenadiers of his Majeſty's guards. Sir William Howe "came to the quarters I was in, with his Aids-de-camp, a "little before ſunſet, and gave me orders to move on in front, "with the grenadiers, and light-infantry of the guards, to "Major Simcoe's poſt, about half a mile in front of the line of "infantry; acquainting me at the ſame time, that I might "expect the enemy at day-break next morning. I can therefore "add, that the firing of the enemy, on the morning of the at-"tack of German-Town, began exactly, or near the time, that "Sir William Howe acquainted me the night before it "would do."

Q. "From the evidence you have given, do you apprehend, "that Sir William Howe had certain intelligence, on the even-

"ing

" ing preceding the attack at German-Town, that the enemy " would march towards him?"

A. " I believe I have been pretty accurate in my anſwer to " the firſt queſtion, in which I ſaid, that Sir William Howe " came to the houſe in which I was poſted, and informed me, " that the enemy would begin the attack in the morning, exactly " at the hour at which they did."

Q. " Notwithſtanding the declaration from the Commander " in Chief of the army, do you conceive, that our army was " ſurpriſed at German-Town, or otherwiſe?"

A. " What I ſpeak in evidence can be merely in my own " ſituation, and I hope, it is not arrogance if I ſay, that after " the information I received from the Commander in Chief, I " was not in any danger of being ſurpriſed."

Q. " Do you conceive that any other part of the army was " ſurpriſed?"

A. " I cannot anſwer to that from my own knowledge, and " therefore, from the ſituation in which I am, I beg to decline " that queſtion."

Q. " Was it the general opinion of the officers with whom " you converſed, after the action, that ſome other part of the " army was ſurpriſed, or not?"

A. " That queſtion being exactly the ſame as the laſt, only " in other words, I can merely add, that the officers, with " whom I converſed, while I had the honour of ſerving under " Sir William Howe, were always well ſatisfied with the care " he had of his army."

I have now gone through the whole Pamphlet, except the Appendix, which requires no particular obſervation, as it contains merely a falſe compariſon of the Britiſh and rebel forces.

Several other anonymous writers have made free with my reputation: but of their productions I take no notice, becauſe their aſſertions, their reaſoning, and their ſcurrility, appear to have been

been all collected and methodiſed, in the *Letters to a Nobleman*. My remarks upon that production, have been confined principally to facts: the falſe reaſoning I have ſometimes endeavoured to detect; the ſcurrility, I have always paſſed over in ſilence. Contempt is the only ſpecies of reſentment which the venal inſtruments of calumny deſerve; though ſomething farther may be due to their more infamous employers.

WILLIAM HOWE.

FINIS.